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A STUDY OF GUARDIANSHIP IN NORTH DAKOTA

I. INTRODUCTION
When a court determines that a person lacks the capacity to
make or communicate the decisions necessary to manage his own
personal affairs, a guardian may be appointed. 1 Guardianship
procedures allow the guardian to provide a proxy consent on behalf
of the ward. 2 Guardianship is a result of the legal process by which
a court appoints a guardian to supervise and protect a person and,
in some instances, the property of an incapacitated or incompetent
person. 3 The state, acting under its parens pariae power, is permitted
to intervene and act in the "best interests" of those unable to care
for themselves.

4

The casual and informal atmosphere of most guardianship
proceedings is deceptive. 5 Determining whether.a proposed ward is
1. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 30.1-28 (1983).
2. Schmidt. Guardianship afthe Elderly in Florida, 55 FLA. B.J. 189 (1981).
3. N.D. CE NT. COD ch. 30.1-26 (1976). Although the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) divides
guardianship into two parts: guardianship, provisions for protecting the ward's person, and
c(((serac orship, provisions fo
tr protecting property: a guardian is also responsible for the property of
tlie \\ ard if a conservator is not appointed. N.D. Ctssr. CODE § 30.1-28-12 (Supp. 1983).
4. Dussault. Guardianship and Limited Guardianship in I4-ashington State: Application for Alentally
Rctarded Citizens, 13 GoNz. L. REV. 585. 598 (1977-78).
I\1I
u'olotoentators his e indicated that while there are strigeio procedural protections when
the state exercises its police powser. the parenspatriae power of'the state has traditionalIy been exercised
in an 1itf i mal. nonadersarial setting: "Proceedings fabled parens patriae conti'nue to deprive
id ividuals of fundaitental rights without the procedural requirements which wou0l0d assure a
ftiodaien tallv fair hearing. Horstman. Protective Secices for the Elderly: The Limits of ParensPatriae, 40
Mo. L. REV. 215. 221 .(1975).
5. Mitchell. Involuntary Guardianship for Incompetents." A Strategy .for Legal Sertices Advocates, 12
CL s-RINiGitOL'S
RFs. 451". 454 (1978). Mitchell states that roany guardianship hearings are

46
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capable of making rational judgments concerning his personal6
affairs is an extremely difficult and complex task for a court.
Further, the proceeding is particularly important because a judicial
declaration of incompetence or incapacity can involuntarily
transfer the alleged incompetent's power of consent to a courtappointed guardian. 7 Thus, for a prospective ward, the
consequences of being adjudicated incompetent are drastic. 8 In
addition to the stigma of being labeled incompetent, 9 the ward loses
the fundamental liberties of the right to choose where to live, the
right to consent or refuse medical care or treatment, and the right
to control and manage property. 10 Anyone can, of course,
voluntarily give another person the power to act in his behalf; but
only a judicial determination of incapacity or incompetence
involuntarily transfers the power to consent. It
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the area of
meaningless formalities. which may only last for a few minutes. Id. (citations omitted).-Typicall5y the
petitioner and his or her attorney are tihe only parties present. Id. (citations omitted). Consequently,
tibte court relies on information supplied by the petitioner and the hearing usually ends with the court
adopting tile petitioner's c oncilusions. Id. (citations omitted).
Dakota Department q/Human
6. Address by Hofstra Law School Prolessor John J. Regan, ANorth
Services Workshop (September 20, 1983). One commentator has suggested the use of a minimm
rationality test similar to that used by courts to determine tie constitutionality of legislation. Id.
7. SeeN.D, CENT. Coo § 30. 1-28-12 (Supp. 1983). Section 30.1-28-12 provides in relevant part
as follows:
A guardian of nit incapacitated person has the same powers, rights, and duties
respecting his ward that a parent has respecting his unetaancipated minor child except
tha t a guardian isinot liable to third persons for acts of the ward solely by reason o' the
parental relationship. In particular. and without quali'Ving the foregoing. a guardian
has (tie following powers and duties. except ts modified by order oithe court when the
gtiardiaiship islimited:
A gtiardia mtay give ally consents ot appoals fhiltia' be necessriy to
itable (fi' id to teceive Medical or other professional care. CoitinSe,
treatnltent or service.
/d.
3B
cng
8. Shernman. Guardanship: limejor a Reasseusment, 49 FORDnAMi L. REv, 350, 358 (1980.
Libelled an "incompetent" can be especially de\ astating to the elderly 'ho once had keen minds and
\ere able to function as productive citizens, Id.
9. The term "incompetent" is not used in the Unifor il Probate Code (UPC). whichitas,
adopted by North Dakota in 1973. See N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 301 (1976 & Supp+ 1983). The UPC
uses tie terms "incapacitated" and "disability" rather than inconspetent. So',eenera, UNI. PROB.
CODE (West 5th ed. 1977). The definition of' "incapacitated person'' provides thIe basis ft the
as defined in
apptiintment of a guardian. N.D. CENT. CODE §30.1-26-01'(1)(1976). "Disability,'
3
5 30.1-01-06 (10), is keyed to the causes listed in § 30.1-29-01 (1). Id 30.1-01-06(i0) (198 ). So'also
id. § 30.1-29-01 (1) (1976). Although the change avoids the negative connotations of the word
.'incompetent." the UPC's scheme of guardianship and conservatorship actually expands tile
availability of guardianship and conservatorships.
10. N.I). CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-12"(Supp. 1983). A number ofiother rights nsay also be at stake
ini a guardianship proceeding. For example, after a guardian is appointed. rise court shall determine
" isether tise incapacitated persosi is mentally incompetent and its such is not qualiied to \ote. -See
id. § 30.1-28-04 (1). Also, art attorney must withdraw from representing a client if '"his mental or
physical condition renders it unreasonably difficlt for hiri to carr\ tie eliployisent effectisely."
NMOltEt. C(ODE OF PROFESSIONAt. REsPONSIBILITS DR 2-110 (B) (3) ( 1979).
11. Mitchell. The Objects of Our Wisdom and Our Csrrcion Invohntac Guardianshipfor Iinompt'nts.
52 S. Cm.. L. RE:. 1405, 1434-35 (1979).
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guardianship law. One factor contributing to this renewed interest
is the dramatic increase in the number of elderly persons who often
are likely to require supportive services. 12 Demographic trends
reflect an increase in the number of people sixty-five years old and
older, and a sharp proportionate increase in the number of those
seventy-five and older.1 3 One report indicated that there are
814,000 persons sixty-five years old and over in state hospitals and
similar institutions.1 4 Although this figure represents only
approximately five percent of all elderly persons,1 5 it is the source of
many of the commonly held stereotypes concerning aging and the
elderly, 16 including the view reflected by the Uniform Probate
Code (UPC) that old age is a disability and an indication of
incompetency. 17
A second factor contributing to renewed interest in
guardianship is the aggressive program pursued by advocates for
the developmentally disabled and their support of the principle of
normalization of programs and services for developmentally
disabled persons.' 8 In addition, recent federal court cases have
contributed to increased interest in guardianship by identifying a
right to appropriate treatment and habilitation, 19 a right to
treatment in the least restrictive and appropriate setting, 20 and the
21
right to special education for developmentally disabled persons.
12. See Schmidt, supra note 2,at 189.
13. Families: Aging and Changing. Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 52 (1980) (statement of Elaine Brody, Pres., Gerontology Society and Director of Human
Serv., Philadelphia Geriatrics Center).
14. M. WEINER, A. BROK, & A. SNADOWSKY, THE INSTITUTIONALIZED AGED, WORKING WITH THE
AGED 56-57 (1978).
15. Id.

16. Id.
17. The UPC defines an "incapacitated person" as "any person who is impaired by reason of
mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age . . . or other cause
(except minority) to the extent he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate
responsible decisions concerning his person." UNIF. PROB. CODE 5 5-101 (1) (West 5th ed. 1977);
N.D. Cent. Code § 30.1-26-01(i) (1976). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
Laws amended this definition in 1982 by deleting the words "concerning his person." UNIF.
GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 1-201(7) (1982). This amendment has not been
adopted by North Dakota. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-26-01(1) (1976).
18. W. WOLFENSBERGER, NORMALIZATION 27 (1972).
19. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (1982) (mentally retarded individual,
involtntarily committed to a state institution, has constitutionally protected right of reasonable care
and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement, and training or habilitation as may be required);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (when mentally ill patients are involuntarily committed through noncriminal
procedures, the patient has a constitutional right to receive treatment).
20. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). The Court stated that "even though the
government purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." Id. at
488. The least restrictive alternative doctrine has been applied to regulations involving both the
mentally retarded and the mentally ill. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)
(regulations for the mentally ill); Lake v. Carmeron, 346 F.2d 657, 661-62 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(treatment for senility).
21. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2463 (1982). In Youngberg, the Court held that the
respondent, a mentally retarded person involuntarily committed to a Pennsylvania state institution,
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As the result of a federal district court order, many of the residents
of the Grafton State School at Grafton, North Dakota, will be
22
transferred to community programs.
The concept of using guardianship as a device to assist
developmentally disabled persons in less restrictive community
settings was one of the primary considerations leading to the
passage of a limited guardianship bill during the 1983 legislative
session. 23 The limited guardianship amendments explicitly allow
the court to tailor the guardianship to the actual needs and
disabilities of a prospective ward. 24 Thus, by providing for
guardianship for limited purposes, guardianship in North Dakota
25
is no longer an all-or-nothing proposition.
North Dakota case law in the area of substitute decisionmakers has been limited primarily to guardianships involving
property matters and conservatorships. Furthermore, while the
UPC and the North Dakota Century Code (Century Code) contain
numerous provisions concerning the rights, duties, and liabilities of
conservators, there is a conspicuous absence of statutory direction
and case law regarding the responsibilities of guardians.2 6 This
Project will, therefore, focus on the guardianship of incapacitated
persons under North Dakota guardianship law and will include the
following areas: First, an overview of the development of North
Dakota's guardianship statute; second, the guardianship process;
and third, some of the problematic powers of guardianship.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT
GUARDIANSHIP LAW

A.

OF

NORTH

DAKOTA'S

PRE-1973 GUARDIANSHIP LAW

Under North Dakota's pre-1973 guardianship law, the county
had constitutionally protected liberty interests under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, including the right to training necessary for the acquisition of needed skills. Id. at 245863. In addition, the North Dakota Constitution provides for public education for all children
extending through all grades. N.D. CoNST. art. VIII § 1, 2. The North Dakota Supreme Court has
interpreted these provisions to include handicapped children who can benefit from an education. In
reG.H., 218 N.W.2d 441,446 (N.D. 1974).
22. Association of Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 494 (D.N.D. 1982). The
court in part ordered that a comprehensive system of services be developed by North Dakota for the
"diagnosis, evaluation, habilitation and rehabilitation of class members, including but not limited to
institutional services, family care and support to the family, foster care, day care, respite care, crisis
intervention, community residences, development centers, and work activity centers." Id.
23. Limited Guardianships, 1983: Hearings on H. B. 1057 Before the Senate Comm. on Social Services and
Veteran's Affairs, 48th N.D. Leg. (1983) (statement of Representative Earl Pomeroy, District 24,
Valley City).
30
2 8 04
24. N.D. CENT. CODE §
.1- - (l)(Supp. 1983). Section 30.1-28-04(1) provides in relevant
part: "The court shall exercise the authority conferred in this chapter consistent with the maximum
self-reliance and independence of the incapacitated person and make appointive and other orders
only to the extent necessitated by the incapacitated person's actual mental and adaptive limitations
or other conditions warranting the procedure." Id.
25. Id.
26. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 30.1-28 (guardianship) with id. ch. 30.1-29 (conservatorship).
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court could appoint a guardian for the person or the estate of any
incompetent state resident. 27 In 1960, section 30-10-02 of the
Century Code defined an incompetent person as a minor without a
legal guardian, a habitual drunkard who was incompetent to
manage his property, a spendthrift, or a person of unsound mind or
other mental incapacity or otherwise incompetent to manage his
property. 28 The statute, however, failed to define the terms
habitual drunkard, spendthrift, unsound mind, or to specify the
persons unable to
degree of incompetence required to render
29
manage property or care for themselves.
This lack of definition permitted the county court unlimited
30
discretion in determining whether or not to appoint a guardian.
The guardianship proceeding was initiated by the filing of a
petition in a county court. 3 1 The alleged incompetent was served a
citation, giving notice of the filing and the date of the hearing on
the petition. 32 After an informal hearing, which the attendance of
the alleged incompetent was not required, the court could appoint a
guardian if it determined that an appointment was either necessary
or convenient. 33 Furthermore, the statutes did not require a
medical evaluation or other evidence demonstrating that the
proposed ward was actually incompetent.3 4 The court, in its
discretion, could appoint a guardian ad litem. 35 As distinguished
of proof
from the UPC, the Century Code established no standard
36
for determining whether a person was incompetent.
This statutory scheme permitted, in theory at least, a person
who resided with the alleged incompetent to secure an appointment
as guardian by merely filing a petition asserting that the proposed
ward was incompetent. 37 Since the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure allowed substitute service of the notice to a competent
adult residing at the same address as the alleged incompetent, 38 it
27. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-10l-02 (1960) (repealed 1973).
28. Id.
29. See id. in the case of In re Thoreson's Guardianship, 82 N.D. 101, 4 N.W.2d 822 (1942), the
court suggested that while physical incapacity is a factor to be considered in determining
incom petency. it is not a true measure of incotmpetency, Id. at 106, 4 N.W.2d at 824. Later, in In re
Guardianship of Frank. 137 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1965), the court affirmed a finding of comnpetency

even though the prospective ward's I.Q. was only 67 due to advancing age. Id. at 221.
30. See.generally N.D. C.N'r. CODEoh. 30-10 (1960)(repealed 1973).
31. See id. § 30-10-05.
32. Id
33. Id.
34. Seeid. ch. 30- 10.
35. Id. § 30-10-24.
36. Compare N.D. CENT. CoDEoch. :30-10 (1960) (repealed 1973) with id. ch. 30.1-28 (1976 &
Supp. 1983). North Dakota courts have permitted a finding of incompetence based upon a
preponderance of the evidence. See In re Thoreson's Guardianship. 82 N.D. 101, 104, 4 N.W.2d 822,
825 (1942).
37. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 30-10-05 (1960) (repealed 1973).
38. N.D.R. Ct. P. 5(b) (1960) (amended 1976, 1977, 1979 & 1983).
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was possible to satisfy the statutory notice requirements and secure
appointment as a full guardian of both the ward's person and
property without ever actually notifying the ward. 3 9 Once
adjudicated incompetent, it was, and still is, difficult for a ward to
terminate the guardianship since a presumption of incapacity
prevails .
The pre-19 7 3 guardianship statute also permitted the
appointment of a guardian for the estate of nonresidents. 4 1 The
statute provided that one interested in the estate of the alleged
incompetent could file a petition in the court of the county in which
the estate was located.4 2 After issuing a citation to all interested
parties and conducting a hearing, which the presence of the alleged
incompetent was not required, the court could appoint a guardian
of the estate even though the only evidence before the court was the
unsupported petition of a person whose interests may have
conflicted with those of the ward. 43 Another provision allowed the
summary appointment of a guardian for an estate when the value
of the property did not exceed five hundred dollars or include real
estate.

44

The potential for abuse is apparent. The lack of adequate
procedural protection is perhaps understandable, however, given
the belief that guardianship is a benevolent proceeding instituted
for the protection of the alleged incompetent. Nevertheless, one
should remember that guardianship may strip individuals of their
right to make personal decisions under the facade of protecting
them .45
B.

GUARDIANSHIP

UNDER

THE UNIFORM

PROBATE

CODE

IN

NORTH DAKOTA

In 1973, North Dakota adopted the Uniform Probate Code
(UPC).4

6

Article V of the UPC divides guardianship into two parts:

39. Id.
40. Goetz v. Gunsch, 80 N.W.2d 548, 552 (N.D. 1956) (the presumption of incapacity prevails
in absence of a showing of restoration to capacity).
41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-10-22 (1960) (repealed 1973).

42. Id.
43. Id. It is readily apparent that the primary concern of North Dakota's pre-1973 guardianship
statute was the protection of the incompetent's property. Historically, in both England and the

United States, a concern to preserve the finances and estate of incompetents was the motive that
prompted local authorities to intervene in the affairs of those considered incompetent or insane.
Mitchell, supra note 11, at 1409-10.
44. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 30-10-25 (1960) (repealed 1973).
45. Jost, The Illinois Guardianshipfor Disabled Adults Legislation of 1978 and 1979: Protecting the
Disabledfrom Their Zealous Protectors, 56 CHi. KENT L. REv. 1087, 1088-91 (1980). AsJustice Brandeis
once said: "Experience should teach its to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
government's purposes are benelicient. ....
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." Ohnsicad v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
46. See Uniform Probate Code Act, ch. 257, 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws 627 (codified as amended at
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provisions

for

protecting

the

conservatorship, provisions for protecting the estate.

person; 47
48

and

The primary

innovations of the UPC were the separation of guardianship of the
person and conservatorship of estates and property,4 9 improved
due process provisions, 50 and improved powers of supervising
courts. 51 Nevertheless, the UPC, like its precursors, reflects greater
concern for property than the welfare of the person. 52 For instance,
the powers of a conservator are much more detailed and specific
than the powers of a guardian. 53 Article V of the UPC also provides
for a durable power of attorney that does not terminate on the
disability or incompetence of the principal. 54 In addition, article V
contains separate provisions for guardianships of minors and
mental incompetents.

55

Chapter 30.1-29 of the Century Code offers a system of
protective proceedings designed to allow the management of
substantial estates by a court appointed conservator. 56 The
definition of disability, which permits the appointment of a
30.1 (1976 & Supp. 1983) (since North Dakota adopted the entire Uniform
N.D. CENT. CODE tit.
Probate Code in 1973 but not all of the subsequent amendments to the Uniform Act, all references
hereinafter to the UPC are cited only to the Century Code unless the Century Code did not adopt a
certain amendment).
47. See N.D. CENT. CODE chs. 30.1-27 (guardians of minors); 30.1-28 (guardians of
incapacitated persons).
48. See id. ch. 30.1-29 (protection of property of persons under disability and minors).
49. The UPC provides a system of protective proceedings, including conservatorship, to provide
for the management of property for persons unable to manage their own property. See N.D. CENT.
Coucch. 30.1-29 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
50. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE 5 30-10-05 (1960) (repealed 1973) with id.S 30.1-28-03 (Supp.
1983). The Uniform Probate Code provides for appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the
proposed ward. Section 30.1-28-09 now provides that waiver of notice by the proposed ward is not
effective unless the proposed ward actually attends the hearing or his waiver is confirmed by the
court-appointed visitor. See id.S 30.1-28-09 (1976).
51. See id § 30.1-28-13(1) (Supp. 1983). Section 30.1-28-13(1) provides for concurrent
jurisdiction between the court in the county where the ward resides and the court that made the
guardianship appointment. Id. The pre-1973 guardianship statute gave exclusive jurisdiction to the
court of appointment in any proceedings subsequent to appointment. See id. § 30-14-04 (1960)
(repealed 1973). The Uniform Probate Code, however, eliminated the mandatory reporting
requirement of the pre-1973 statute in cases in which the anDoraised value of the ward's estate
exceeded $500 in value. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-14-10 (1960)(repealed 1973) with id.S 30.129-19 (1976).
52. See Mitchell, supra note 11, at 1435-36. Mitchell intimates that although most petitions are
filed with the stated purpose to prevent waste of the alleged incompetent's estate, most petitions are
actually filed to protect the petitioner's own interests. Id.
53. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-29-24,-25 (1976) (the powers and duties ofa conservator)
with id.§ 30.1-28-12 (Supp. 1983) (the powers and duties of a guardian).
54. See N.D. CENT- CODE ch. 30.1-30 (1976). Normally, a power of attorney expires upon the
death, disability, or incompetence of the principal provided that the attorney in fact or agent has
knowledge or notice of the expiration. Id. § 30.1-30-02 (1). Ifa power ofattorney is to extend beyond
death, disability, or incompetence of the principal, the document designating another his attorney in
or
iict
agent must explicitly provide for such an occurrence. See id.§ 30.1-30-01.
55. Id.chs. 30.1-27 (guardians of minors); 30.1-28 (guardians of incapacitated persons).
56. See id.ch. 30.1-29 (1976 & Supp. 1983). Chapter 30.1-29 provides for the appointment of a
(oisir\ ator to manage the property and financial affairs of a person who is not incompetent, yet is
unable to manage his property and funds. See id. § 30.1-29-01 (editorial board comment); 30.1-28
-04 (editorial board corment). The chapter also provides for the authorization of other protective
ithout the appointment of a full conservator. See id.S 30.1-29-09 (1976). Although
arrangm niens%%
hc UPC includes provisions for the creation of protective arrangements as alternatives to full

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

60:45

conservator or issuance of another protective order, is very broad. 57
In addition to minority, the causes of disability include mental
illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, old age,
chronic use of drugs or alcohol, confinement, detention by a foreign
power, or disappearance. 58 Although this Project focuses primarily
on guardianship, rather than conservatorship and other protective
arrangements, courts and advocates of incapacited persons can use
conservatorships and other protective orders to create less
restrictive
alternatives
to either
guardianships
or
full
conservatorships

.59

Chapter 30.1-28 of the Century Code provides for
guardianships of
incapacitated persons. 60 Section 30.1-28-01
provides for the testamentary appointment of a guardian by a
parent or spouse of an incapacitated person. 6 1 The Century Code
allows a parent or spouse to confer full authority of guardianship on
a person designated in the parent's or spouse's will even though the
proposed ward has not been adjudicated incapacitated and found to

need a guardian. 62 A testamentary appointment becomes effective
when, after giving seven days' notice to the proposed ward, the
person designated as guardian files acceptance of appointment in
the court in which the will is probated. 63 Only the proposed ward's
written objection, filed with the court in which the will was
probated, terminates the testamentary appointment.6 4 The
conservatorship, there is scant evidence that courts have made use of less restrictive alternatives. See
Note, Limited Guardianship for the Mentally Retarded, 8 N.M.L. RE". 231 (1978).
57. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 31.1-01-06(10) (defines disability as cause for a protective order).
"Protective proceedings" is a generic term used in the UPC to describe proceedings for the
appointment of conservators or to obtain protective orders. Seeid. § 30.1-29-01.
58. Seeid. § 30.1-29-01.
59. Note, supra note 56, at 237-39.
60. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 30.1-28 (1976 & Supp. 1983). The UPC uses the word
"incapacitated" rather than "incompetent."
See supra note 17 and accompanying text for a
definition of"incapacity."
61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-01 (1976). The pre-1973 guardianship statute also permitted a
parent to appoint a guardian by will or deed; however, it uses the word "child" rather than
"incapacitated person." See id. 5 30-10-01 (1960) (repealed 1973). It is therefore unclear whether the
statute would have permitted the testamentary appointment ofa guardian for an adult child.
62. N.D. CENT. CODE S 30.1-28-01(1), (2) (1976). The statute permits a testamentary
appointment of a guardian; apparently relying on the unwritten assumption that neither a spouse
nor a parent acts contrary to the best interests of the spouse or child. In the analogous area of civil
commitment, the Colorado Supreme Court considered a challenge to Colorado's statutory scheme
permitting a minor to be admitted to a state hospital against his will but with the consent of a parent
or legal guardian. P.F. v. Walsh, __
Colo. __
, 648 P.2d 1067 (1982). The Colorado Supreme
Court declared the statutory procedure unconstitutional as a violation of due process since it
contained no admission standard. Id. at __,
648 P.2d at 1071-72. The court distinguished
Colorado's commitment scheme from the Georgia procedure approved by the United States
Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). The distinguishing feature was that
Colorado's scheme did not include statutory admission standards that could be applied by the
hospital staff to determine whether to accept a minor for treatment when admitted by his parents or
legal guardian. Walsh, __Colo.at __, 648 P.2d at 1071.
63. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 30.1-28-01(1), (2)(1976).
64. Id. § 30.1-28-01(4).
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editorial board comment to the UPC suggests that if there is any
doubt concerning the actual incapacity of the proposed ward the
testamentary appointee should follow the procedure for a court
appointment. 65 This protection, however, is inadequate when
balanced against the fundamental 66
rights of the ward that are at
stake when a guardian is appointed.
The UPC's definition of "incapacity" cuts guardianship from
its traditional moorings to functional competence. 67 The pre-1973
statute generally required the court to focus on the actual
behavior of the alleged incompetent in determining whether the
proposed ward was able to care for himself or to manage his own
property. 68 Although the pre-1973 statute did single out habitual
drunkards and spendthrifts for special attention, its primary
emphasis was on the proposed ward's functional competence. 69
The UPC's definition of "incapacity,"
however, directs the
7
0
attention of the court to a list of causes. This list of causes not only
misdirects the attention of the court; it is also unnecessary. 71 The
cause of the proposed ward's disability is irrelevant to the
determination of whether he actually needs a guardian or a
conservator. 72 The need for the appointment of either a guardian or
65. Id. § 30.1-28-01 (editorial board comment).
66. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Although due process is a flexible concept and
not all situations call for the same degree of procedural safeguards, the degree of due process required
by the Constitution depends upon a balancing of the individual's interest and the governmental
interest at issue in a particular situation, a consideration of the risk of an erroneous deprivation ofthe
individual interest by the procedures used, and the value of additional procedural safeguards. Id. at
334.
67. See supra note 17 and accompanying text for a definition of "incapacity.'' Traditionally, the
criteria for the appointment ofa guardian was the ward's inability to care for his person or property.
See Goetz v. Gunsch, 80 N.W.2d 548, 552 (N.D. 1956) (court may appoint a guardian of any person
who "is of unsound mind, or from any cause mentally or otherwise incompetent to manage his
property").
68. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-10-02 (1960) (repealed 1973).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 30.1-26-01(1) (1976). Section 30.1-26-01 (1) provides:
'Incapacitated person' means any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness,
mental deficiency-, physical illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of drugs,
chronic intoxication, or other cause (except minority) to the extent that he lacks
sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions
concerning his person.
Id.
7 1. Mitchell, supra note 5, at 456-57. The list of causes in the statutory definition of incapacity
diverts the attention of the court from the real issue of whether the allegedly incapacitated person is
able to provide essential care for himself. Furthermore, the interest of the state in securing guardians
for those who have demonstrated a functional incompetence would not be hampered by the deletion
of the list of causes from the statutory definition of incapacity. Id.
72. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-26-01, -29-06 (1976). The focal point of the judicial inquiry in
a guardianship proceeding should be the individual's ability to make decisions regarding his basic
needs. Horstman, supra note 4, at 263.
Read literally, the definition of incapacity found in the UPC imposes guardianships and
conservatorships on the basis of the allegedly incompetent person's status, as mentally ill, physically
disabled, drug addict, alcoholic, or aged and the court's subjective determination that the proposed
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conservator can and should be determined by examining the recent
past behavior of the proposed ward,7 3 not his status as elderly,
mentally ill, physically disabled, or alcoholic. Only behavior that
actually endangers the life, health, or personal support of the
proposed ward justifies the involuntary imposition of a
74
guardianship or conservatorship.
The second step in determining whether the proposed ward is
incapacitated requires the court to determine whether the person is
able to make or to communicate "responsible decisions concerning
his

person."

75

The

statute,

however,

does

not

define

"responsible decisions. "76 Consequently, due to the vagueness of
the term, a determination of whether a proposed ward, who can be
labeled with one of the specified suspect conditions, is capable of
making "responsible decisions" concerning his person is left to the
77
discretion of the court.
Despite the vague statutory standards of the UPC, it is largely
an improvement over the pre-1973 guardianship statute. For
instance, the UPC requires the appointment of a physician to
examine the proposed ward and a visitor to interview both the
proposed ward and the person seeking appointment as the
guardian.78 A visitor is defined as "a person who is trained in law,
nursing, or social work and is an officer, employee, or special
appointee of the court with no personal interest in the
proceedings." 7 9 The notice provisions of the UPC partially remedy
the defects of the pre-1973 statute. 80 Under the UPC, a waiver of
ward is unable to make "responsible decisions." See N.D. CENT. CODE 5§ 30.1-26-01, -29-06(10)
(1976).
73. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 30.1-28 (1976 & Supp. 1983). The statute does not require that the
allegedly incapacitated person have actually demonstrated his inability to care for himself. Id. The
potential for abuse is enhanced by the absence of standards for determining whether the alleged
incompetent is able to make "responsible decisions concerning his person." See id. § 30.1-26-01
(1976).
74. Sherman, supra note 8, at 358. In contrast to civil commitment cases in which the state also
has a policy interest in confining those mentally ill persons who are dangerous, the only purpose of
guardianship is to further the well-being of the ward. Id.
75. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-26-01(1) (1976). See supra note 70 for the text of § 30.1-26-01(1).
76. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-26-01 (1976). Using the "responsible decisions" standard, the
danger exists that a court may appoint a guardian if it disagrees with the substance of the proposed
ward's decisions. Friedman, Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis in Mental Institutions and
Prisons, 17 ARIZ. L. REv. 39, 78 (1975). Thus, a judge's decision may be based upon what he would
do in a similar situation. Id. This is particularly important in cases involving the appointment of a
guardian for the purpose of consenting to medical treatment, which the proposed ward has refused.
Id. at 78-80. This becomes apparent if one considers that the proposed ward's refusal to submit to the
needed medical procedure may be viewed as evidence of incompetence. Id.
77. In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah 1981). The Supreme Court of Utah recently rejected
the "responsible decisions" standard and concluded that a guardian may be appointed only when it
is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed ward's health or safety is endangered.
Id. at 1085, 1092.
78. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-03(2) (Supp. 1983).
79. Id. § 30.1-28-08 (1976).
80. ld. § 30.1-28-09.
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notice by the proposed ward is not effective unless he attends the
hearing or his waiver of notice is confirmed in an interview with the
court appointed visitor. 8 1 Additional improvements, however, are
still necessary. For example, the content of the notice is not
specified and the UPC's notice provision specifically provides that
"representation of the alleged incapacitated person by a guardian.
ad litem is not necessary" for an alleged incompetent person to
waive his right to notice. 82 Whether this procedure for waiver of
notice satisfies due process requirements is open to question since
the guardianship petition alleges that the person is not competent to
make responsible decisions concerning his personal welfare. 8 3
The UPC does provide for the appointment of a guardian ad
litem who may be either an attorney or an "appropriate
official. "84 Although the appointment of a guardian ad litem is
mandatory if the proposed ward has not retained counsel, there is
no requirement that the proposed ward be represented by
appointed counsel if the proposed ward does not agree with a
position taken by the court appointed guardian ad litem.8 5 The
proposed ward has the right to be represented by counsel but there
is no requirement for representation by counsel if the proposed
ward cannot afford to hire his own attorney since the court can
appoint an "appropriate official." 86 The traditional role of a
guardian ad litem is to protect and promote the best interests of the
81. Id. § 30.1-28-09(2).
82. Id. The UPC notice provision requires only that the proposed ward be given notice of the
hearing. See id. § 30.1-28-09. Furthermore, the UPC terms "incapacitated person," "protective
proceeding," and "disability," are of doubtful value in a notice to alert proposed wards to the
serious legal and personal consequences ofa guardianship hearing.
83. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In Mullane the United
States Supreme Court addressed the question of the constitutional sufficiency of notice and stated the
critical due process requirement as follows: "[Ain elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314. In a later case in which a "known incompetent"
was a defendant in a foreclosure of a tax lien case, the Court concluded that. even though otherwise
valid, the notice requirement was not sufficient for a pet-son who was known to lack the ability to
understand the nature of the proceedings. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146 (1956). But
see Rud v. Dahl, 578 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1978). In Rud, the plaintiff attacked the facial
constitutionality of the Illinois statutory scheme for guardianship and conservatorship. The plaintiff
alleged that the notice was deficient since it did not define the terms "incompetent"
or
"conservator," state the legal standard used to determine incompetence, and did not point out the
legal and practical consequences that would result if the petition were granted. Id. at 677. The court
found that the notice given the plaintiffwas sufficient as a matter ofdue process to inform him of the
nature and consequences of the proceeding. Id. The plaintiff, an 81 -year-old resident of a nursing
home, was served with a summons to appear at a hearing on a petition to appoint a conservator. Id.
at 676. The plaintiff did not appear at the hearing and no inquiry was made into the reasons for his
absence. Id. On the basis of the petition and a physician's affidavit that the plaintiff was incapable of
managing his person and his estate, he was adjudicated incompetent. Id. Whether the decision of the
court of appeals was based on the content of the notice, the ability of the plaintiff to comprehend the
notice given, or the insufficiency of the plaintiffs complaint, however, is unclear. Id. at 678-79.
84. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-03(2) (Supp. 1983).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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ward. 87 Consequently, a guardian ad litem may be obligated to act
contrary to the expressed desires of the ward and to adopt a position
other than the one urged by the ward. 88 Recent amendments to
article V of the UPC provide for the mandatory appointment of
counsel to represent the proposed ward in a guardianship
proceeding. 8 9 The amendments also grant the court appointed
attorney the powers and duties of a guardian ad litem. 90 This
change gives the court some flexibility to appoint counsel who
would advocate the position urged by his client, and also to impose
the duties of a guardian ad litem when the proposed ward is
incapable of forming or communicating an independent position. 9'
The adoption of the UPC resulted in other changes in North
Dakota's guardianship law. For instance, in proceedings for the
removal of a court appointed guardian, the UPC shifted the focus
from the behavior of the guardian to the best interests of the ward. 92
Another change was in venue for proceedings subsequent to
appointment. 93 The pre-1973 statute limited jurisdiction to the
county court that appointed the guardian; 94 the UPC, however,
gives the court in the county in which the ward resides concurrent
jurisdiction with the appointing court in any subsequent
95
proceedings relating to the guardianship.
C.

THE

1983

LIMITED GUARDIANSHIP AMENDMENTS

During the 1981 legislative session, the North Dakota
Legislature approved a study resolution on guardianship, which
was subsequently assigned to the interim Judiciary Committee. 96
87. See id.ch. 28-03 (1976 & Supp. 1983). See also Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the
Commitment of the Mentally Ill,44 TEX. L. REV. 424 (1966); Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil
Commitment Process: A TheoreticalFramework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1542 (1975).
88. See Andalman & Chambers, Effective CounselJor Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, A
Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. LJ. 43, 48 (1974). Merely appointing counsel to represent the
proposed ward may not result in an adversary proceeding in instances where the mental competence
of the attorney's client has been challenged. Id.
89. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-03(2) (Supp. 1983). Section 30.1-28-03(2) provides that
upon the filing of a petition, the court shall appoint an attorney or appropriate official to represent
the allegedly incapacitated individual unless that person has his own counsel. Id.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. See id. § 30.1-28-07(1) (1976).
93. Id. § 30.1-28-13(l) (1976 & Supp. 1983). Section 30.1-28-13(1) provides in relevant part that
"It]he court where the ward resides has concurrent jurisdiction with the court which appointed the
guardian, or in which acceptance of a testamentary appointment was filed, over resignation,
removal, accounting, and other proceedings relating to the guardianship....
Id.
94. See id. 5 30-10-20 (1960) (repealed 1973).
95. Id. 5 30.1-28-13(1) (1976 & Supp. 1983).
96. Limited Guardianship, 1983: Hearings on H. B. 1057 Before the Senate Comm. on Social Services and
Veteran's Affairs, 48th N.D. Leg. (1983) (statement of Barbara Braun, Director of the Protection and
Advocacy Project) .
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The immediate concern of state officials was the section of the
North Dakota Century Code, which after ninety days designated
the superintendent of the Grafton State School the guardian of all
persons admitted to the institution unless the parents of those
persons notified him in writing that they wished to retain their
guardianship. 97 In addition to the constitutional defects of this
provision, there is an inherent conflict of interest when the provider
of services is also the guardian. 98 State officials also expressed
concern for the potential liability of the superintendent under
federal law. 9 9
Additional impetus for new legislation was provided when the
Association for Retarded Citizens filed a lawsuit in United States
District Court on behalf of six Grafton State School residents. 0 0
The district court ordered the State to cut the population of the
Grafton State School and its San Haven unit and to initiate a
statewide service delivery system for the mentally retarded,
including training and community based housing.1 0' Although
most of the testimony in support of the legislation focused on the
delivery of services to the developmentally disabled, the limited
guardianship
amendments
apply
to all
guardianship
102
proceedings.
The limited guardianship bill' 0 3 can be roughly divided into
three parts: first, the statutory guardianship of the superintendent
of the Grafton State School; 0 4 second, the provisions relating only
to services for developmentally disabled persons;1 0 5 and third, the
limited guardianship mandate. 1 0 6 Each division of the bill will be
discussed separately below.
97. Id.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982). This class
action suit was initiated by six mentally retarded residents of North Dakota and the Association for
Retarded Citizens of North Dakota. Id. at 475. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution by failing to
provide a sufficient program of habilitation. Id. at 471. The plaintiffs also alleged that due process
mandates that the defendants "develop less restrictive, community based alternatives for the care
and treatment of voluntarily and involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons." Id. In
addition, the plaintiffs alleged that both rights were guaranteed by chapter 25-01.2 of the North
Dakota Century Code. Id. See N.D. CENT. ConE ch. 25-01.2 (Supp. 1983). Finally, the plaintiffs
conmtended that certain conditions existed at the institutions that constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. 561 F. Supp. at 471.
101. 561 F. Supp. at 494-95.
102. Limited Guardianship Act, ch. 313, 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 764, 768.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 764.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Statutory Guardianship of the Superintendent of the
Grafton State School.

The Limited Guardianship Act amended section 25-04-13.1 of
the North Dakota Century Code, which provided that the
superintendent of the Grafton School became the guardian of any
resident who did not have a court appointed guardian or whose
parents had not indicated a desire to retain their natural
guardianships. 10 7 The amendments directed the superintendent of
the Grafton State School to divest himself of the statutory
guardianships during the two year period from July 1, 1983, to
July 1, 1985.108 The Act provides two methods for this divestiture:
first, by renunciation when the superintendent decides that a
guardian is not necessary; or second, through seeking a court
appointed guardian when guardianship is necessary. 109
The qualifying clauses "when guardianship is not necessary"
and "when guardianship is necessary" in section 1 of the Limited
Guardianship Act indicate an intent that the superintendent weigh
and consider the need of a resident for a guardian. 110 One of the
best indicators of a resident's need for guardianship is the
individualized habilitation plan (IHP) l ' since section 2 of the Act
requires that the IHP "[s]tate whether the developmentally
disabled person appears to need a guardian and determine the type
of protection needed by the individual based on the individual's
actual mental and adaptive limitations and other conditions which
may warrant the appointment of a guardian.

11 2

Furthermore, the

section of the Century Code that provides for statutory
guardianship by the superintendent states that "the guardianship
provided for by this section is in lieu of court appointment . . .but

carries the same powers and duties. 11113 Additionally, the Act itself
provides that "[t]he guardianship provided by this section carries
the same duties and powers as court appointed guardians provided
for in chapters 30.1-26 through 30.1-30 [Article V of the Uniform
107. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 25-04-13.1(1) (1976) (aienrided 1983).
108. Limited Guardianship Act, ch. 313, 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 764, 765-67 (codified as
amended at N.D. Cent. Code § 25-04-13.1 (1) (Supp. 1983)).
109. N.D. CENT. CODE §25-04-13.1(1) (Supp. 1983).
I1 ISee Limited guardianship Act, I.313. 1983 N.D. Sess. L.a%%s 764, 764.
l1. The term "individual habilitation plan" is not diefined in the Century Code. See N.D.
CENT. CODE ch. 25-01.2 (Supp. 1983). "Habilitation" is the tern of art generally used to refer to
that education. training, and care required by deselopnientally disabled persons to reach their
tnax itnl deeloptnitnt. See.e... Haldernian \-. Penniturst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp.
1295. 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1978). modified, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979). rer'd, Pennhursi State School &
Hosp. \-. Halderrian. 451 U.S. 1(1981).
112. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 25-01.2-14 (7) (Supp. 1983).
113. Id.S 25-04-1-3.1 (1977) (amended 1983).
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Probate Code]. "114 Thus, an evaluation of the resident's need for a
guardian as a part of his IHP should be a prerequisite to any action
by the superintendent to renounce or transfer a guardianship. In
addition, when the superintendent is the current guardian of a
resident, he has an obligation to act in the best interests of his
ward. 115
The procedure provided in the Act suggests that the legislature
did not intend a pell-mell rush by the superintendent of the Grafton
State School to divest himself of his statutory guardianships but
rather a procedure in which the superintendent carefully evaluates
the needs of each resident. 116 Finally, as the present guardian of a
number of residents of the Grafton State School, the
superintendent has a fiduciary obligation to act in their best
interests. I11
2. Servicesfor Developmentally DisabledPersons
The Limited Guardianship Act amended the statutory
requirements for the IHP by requiring that the IHP state whether
the developmentally disabled person needs a guardian and
determine the degree of protection the person needs." 8 The
assessment of need for a guardian is based upon the "individual's
actual mental and adaptive limitations and other conditions which
may warrant the appointment of a guardian." 119 The Act also
provides that any member of the IHP team may petition for the
finding of incapacity and the appointment of a guardian or notify
an interested party to file such a petition. 120 Furthermore,
discussions by the House Appropriations Committee of the
legislature indicated that any member of the IHP team could file
the petition even though the other IHP team members disagreed. '21
114. Id. 25-04-13. 1 (Stpp. 1983).
115. Id..30.1-28-07 (1976). Section 30.1-28-07 pro ides as Ibllows: "On petition of he wiard or
aill pcirstl ilter'ested illhis \'iiare. il( co t ll t rinlove a guardian antid appoint a stit ess)l" if 'in
the best int're'sts
q1the ward. - Id.(enmphasis added). Section 30. 1-27-06 stales. "This court may appoint
its
guardian any person whose appointment would be inthe best
i'resis f-the
minor. - Id § 30.1-27-06
(eiphasis added).

116. Id. + 25-04-13.1 (Stpp. 1983). The Act provides tora twNo-year period during wfhich the
S eiltietidfnl illaVitiliIllite
aftiei
0 diys, notice ill\%riti g to the esidelt's pairent. ad\ iatc. ind
Is
Miang .
an d foti alll t iahlatitin
if' [lie reisi(et' s iced lot a gotulini
ilie
h resident's I H P tciir.

Id.§ 25-0 1.2-14.
1 17. x'

25-0(4- 13.I
1 1976): 3). 1-28-12 (Stip . 1983). Sn alfThornpsO V.
1978 l.
It /h/inpso
liit"
Norti Dakota S itepitiic Coiuti
\\'ir)tc.
-A gtuardian or c iiu cti or is it fiduciary .
. As sucfh. lie ii\cs it \-ciy high dtegi'ct' of good
fih
Il
lie ward. ic t'li'
)t"lit ss and i f ift' pti sots inicrtsted ill it e state."
i
d.d il 764
N. ).

ETi

(1i. i

§
,

FirstNaI. Bank. 269 N.\s 2f 763 (N.I).
(citations o nlilttet).

118. See N.D. CE\
119. Id.
121. Id.

i. CoDE

§ 25-01.2-14 (Su p p. 1983).

121. Limited Guardianship. 1983: Hcadin,,uon t. B. 10.57 B'/i,,"
ti" Hws.n'
Comm. on 4ppioiatin
48thI N.D. Leg. (1983).
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The statute already required that the IHP be "reviewed and
updated from time to time, but no less than annually. 1 2 Thus,
the need of each developmentally disabled person for a guardian
will be closely monitored. 123
To facilitate the use of guardianships to help developmentally
disabled persons function in community settings, the Limited
Guardianship Act changes those persons who may be appointed
guardian and the priority for appointment. 124 The Act provides
that a designated person from a suitable institution, agency, or
nonprofit home may be appointed guardian of an incapacitated
person.' 2 5 The Act, however, specifically prohibits the appointment
of the institution, agency, or nonprofit home providing the care
and custody of the ward. 126 Nevertheless, if no one else can be
found to serve as the guardian, the court may appoint an employee
of an agency, institution, or nonprofit home that provides the ward
care and custody after making a specific finding that the
appointment does not present a substantial risk of a conflict of
interest. 127
The Act adds two groups to the priority list for appointment as
guardian.1 28 If the incapacitated person's spouse, adult children,
parent, or any relative with whom he has resided for more than six
months prior to the filing of the petition does not desire to be
appointed guardian, the court may appoint any relative or friend
who has maintained significant contacts with the incapacitated
129
person or a designated person from a volunteer agency.
Assuming that no one else can be found to serve as the guardian,
the next level of priority permits the appointment of a designated
employee of any appropriate government agency, including county
social service agencies, when that employee does not provide direct
care to the imcompetent person and the court makes a specific
finding that the appointment presents no substantial risk of a
conflict of interest. 13 0 An amendment was introduced to allow the
122. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 25-01.2-14(2) (Supp. 1983).
123. Id. § 30.1-28-12. There is no mandatory requirement forjudicial review of guardianship in
North Dakota; however, the court may require a guardian to make periodic reports concerning the
condition of his ward. Id. Some form of periodic review of involuntary guardianships may be
required. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (periodic review is necessary to support
continuing commitment for mental illness); see also NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, Protective,

Services and Guardianship;Legal Services andthe Role of the Advocate in Representing Older Persons43 (1982).
124. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-11 (Supp. 1983).
125. Id. 5 30.1-28-11(1).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. S 30.1-28-11(2).
129. Id. 530.1-28-11(2) (a)-(e).
130. Id. § 30.1-28-11(2) (0. This would, however, put the state back in the guardianship
business. One authority has suggested that the state should encourage a private charitable agency to
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court to pass over a person having priority and appoint a person
having a lower priority when the court determined that it was in the
best interests of the incapacitated person. 13 1 The legislature,
1
however, rejected the amendment.

3 2

Another provision of the Act is of only temporary significance
because it requires the superintendent of the Grafton State School
to divest himself of statutory guardianships by July 1, 1985.13
When the petitioner makes a request on behalf of a proposed ward
who is or was formerly a ward of the superintendent of the Grafton
State School, the state's attorney of the county in which the petition
34
is filed must handle the court proceeding for the petitioner. 1
The petitioner may have a choice of venue.1 35 In proceedings

to appoint a guardian, venue lies in the county in which the
proposed ward resides or is present. 136 This section provides that
the petition can be filed in the county in which the mental health
37
1
board that ordered the person admitted to the institution sits.

Since many of the residents of the Grafton State School were
admitted by warrants for commitment issued by county boards, the
petition can also be filed in that county. 138 Although the county in
which the proposed ward is present may be the most convenient for
the state and, in terms of physical access, for the ward; it may
neither be the most convenient for the proposed guardian nor the
most appropriate for the proposed ward.' 39 In addition, the county
develop a guardianship program and the state agency could then maintain a supervisory role.
Address by Hofstra Law School Professor John J. Regan, North Dakota Department of Human Services
Workshop (September 20, 1983).
131. Limited Guardianship, 1983: Hearingson H. B. 1057 Before the Senate Comm. on Social Services and
Veteran's Affairs, 48th N.D. Leg. (1983) (statement of Beth Wosick, Assistant Director, Mental
Health Ass'n). The amendment read as follows: "With respect to persons having equal priority, the
court shall select the one it deems best qualified to serve. The court, acting in the best interest of the
incapacitated person, may pass over a person having priority and appoint a person having a lower
priority." Id.
132. See Limited Guardianship Act, ch. 313, 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 769-70.
133. N.D. CENT. CODE S 25-04-13.1 (Supp. 1983). Section 25-04-13.1 provides that the
superintendent of the Grafton State School must divest himself of statutory guardianships by July 1,
1985. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. State statistics reveal the following: 678 Grafton residents were admitted by warrant
and 189 residents of San Haven were admitted by warrant. Defendant's Answer to Interrogatories at
6, Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982).
Until 1957, admissions to the Grafton State School were made by warrant. Section 25-04-05 of the
North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 provided that commitments to the State School were to be
conducted in the same manner as commitments to the State Hospital. N.D. REV. CODE § 25-0405
(1944) (amended 1967). Section 25-0301 of the Revised Code established insanity boards in each
county, which were comprised of the county judges, a physician, and a practicing attorney. Id. § 25
-0301 (amended 1957). Warrants fbr commitment were issued pursuant to Section 25-0317 of the
Revised Code. Id. § 25-0312 (amended 1957). The county insanity boards later became county
mental health boards. Compare N.D. REV. CODE § 25-0301 (1943) (amended 1957) with id. § 25-0311
(Supp. 1957)(repealed 1977).
139. Letter from Mary Deutsch Schneider, Ass'n. for Retarded Citizens Co-Counsel and Staff
Attorney with Legal Assistance of North Dakota, to Melvin Webster (June 24, 1983) (discussing
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in which a developmentally disabled person is present may not be
the county of his legal residence. 140 For residents of Grafton State
School, Walsh County is the county of actual residence;
nevertheless, it may not provide the most appropriate venue. 1 4'
The touchstone in determining venue is the protection of the
42
proposed ward's rights and best interests. 1
3. The Limited GuardianshipProvisions
Arguably, even prior to the enactment of the limited
guardianship amendments, the UPC's guardianship statute would
have permitted a court to adopt the individualized approach to
guardianship mandated by the new law. 143 Now there is no
question. Limited guardianship is a part of North Dakota's general
guardianship statute; and guardianship in North Dakota is no
longer an all-or-nothing proposition. 144
' 45
In addition to expanding the definitions of "conservator"'
and "guardian"' 46 to include limited conservators and limited
guardians, the Act directs the court to exercise its authority
consistent with the "maximum self-reliance and independence of
the incapacitated person and make appointment and other orders
only to the extent necessitated by the incapacitated person's actual
mental and adaptive limitations or other conditions warranting the
procedure.'' 4 This requires the court to make item-specific
determinations and that the powers of the guardian be tailored to
the actual limitations of the ward. 148 Since the disabilities of an
incapacitated person may diminish, the Act permits the court to
limit the powers of the guardianship at the time of appointment or
at a later date.

49

venue in guardianship proceedings). The convenience of the guardian, or the petitioner, should not
be given precedence over the rights of the ward; nevertheless, it is a factor to be considered if the
county of commitment offers convenience to the family of the resident, the proposed ward, an
unbiased visitor, or is the proposed area of community placement. Id.
140. Determining the legal residence of a mentally retarded person can be difficult.
Complicating factors such as minority, involuntary commitment, voluntary commitment, voluntary
admission to a residential care facility, placement in a private facility, and the existence of a court
appointed guardian should be carefully considered.
141. Letter from Mary Deutsch Schneider, Ass'n. for Retarded Citizens Co-Counsel and Staff
Attorney with Legal Assistance of North Dakota, to Melvin Webster (June 24, 1983) (discussing
venue in guardianship proceedings).
142. Id. Cf N.D. CENT. CODE S 30.1-02-03 (3) (1976). Section 30.1-02-03 (3) provides in part:
"Iwhenj in the interest ofjustice a proceeding or a file should be located in another court of this state,
the court making the findings may transfer the proceeding or file to [the] other court." Id.
143. See Note, Limited Guardianshipforthe Mentally Retarded,-8 N.M.L. REV. 231, 235-37 (1978).
144. See Limited Guardianship Act, ch. 313, 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 764, 769; N.D. CENT. CODE
30.1-28-04(1) (Supp. 1983).
145. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-01-06(7) (Supp. 1983).
146. Id. § 30.1-01-06(17).
147. Id. §§ 30.1-28-04(1) (limited guardianship); 30.1-29-08 (1) (limited conservatorship).
148. Id. §5 30.1-28-04, -29-08.
149. Id. S 30.1-28-04(3).
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The Act specifically requires the court to determine whether
the proposed ward is mentally incompetent and thus not qualified
to vote. 150 The limited guardianship concept recognizes degrees of
incapacity or incompetence and requires the court to match the
guardian's responsibilities with the ward's actual mental and
adaptive limitations. 5 ' Thus, some individuals under limited
guardianships may be capable of making rational voting decisions
1 52
and may retain their right to vote.
III. THE GUARDIANSHIP PROCESS
A.

THE DEFINITION OF INCAPACITY

The UPC standard of incapacity, which was adopted by North
Dakota, authorizes the appointment of a guardian for any
incapacitated person.' 5 3 An "incapacitated person" is defined as
follows:
[A]ny person who is impaired by reason of mental illness,
mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced
age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other
cause (except minority) to the extent that he lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible
decisions concerning his person. 154
The statutory definition has two components: the first describes the
person's disability, his physical or mental condition; the second
identifies the disability resulting from his physical or mental
condition. 155 The definition also includes a catch-all category of
"any other cause (except minority).'' 56 Thus, a typical petition
might allege, for instance, that the person is impaired due to
advanced age and lacks the capacity to make or communicate
57
responsible decisions concerning his personal welfare. 1
150. Id.§ 30.1-28-04(i).
151. Id.
152. Id. The language of North Dakota's elector's statute is more restrictive than that of the
North Dakota Constitution. Compare N.D. CONST. art. II, § 2 with N.D. CENT. CODE 5 16.1-01-04
(1981). The language of the constitutional provision controls since the legislature cannot enlarge or
diminish the qualifications necissary to entitle one to vote at a constitutional election. Johnson v.
Grand Forks County, 16 N.D.363, 368, 113 N.W. 1071, 1072 (1907).
153. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 30.1-26-01(1) (1976). In addition to North Dakota, the following
states have adopted the UPC guardianship provisions: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Utah.
154. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-26-01(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
155. Seeid.
156. Id
157. Id.Since the UPC standard defines an "incapacitated person" to include a person who is
impaired from any cause other than minority, the determination that the person is actually

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60:45

This standard has frequently been criticized for focusing on
the status of the proposed ward rather than on the proposed ward's
actual conduct.1 5 8 Once a proposed ward is labeled elderly,
mentally ill, mentally retarded, physically disabled, a drug addict
or alcoholic the court is given virtually unlimited discretion to
determine whether the person has the understanding or capacity to
make responsible decisions. 15 9 Therefore, some critics argue that
the definition of incapacity is so vague that it denies the allegedly
incapacitated person due process. 160 Procedural safeguards have
little significance when the standard for determining incapacity is
vague. 16 1 One key to the definition of incapacity is the status
component of North Dakota's guardianship statute. 162 If a label
such as elderly, mentally ill, or mentally retarded can be attached to
the proposed ward, the court's attention is then directed to the
functional component, the ability of the proposed ward to make or
communicate
"responsible
decisions.", 163 The
adjective
"responsible" focuses the judicial inquiry on the content of the
decision rather than on the ability of the proposed ward to make
decisions concerning his personal welfare. 164 Consequently, some
commentators have suggested that the criterion of incapacity be
more process centered. 165 Stated another way, the court should
determine whether the proposed ward is able to provide
recognizable reasons for his decision. 16 6 A commentator has
suggested that courts use the "minimum rationality" test, which is
often used by courts to determine the constitutional validity of
incapacitated and needs a guardian depends on the court's evaluation of the proposed ward's ability
to make responsible decisions concerning his personal welfare. Significantly, the phrase "responsible
decision" is not detined in the statute. See N.D. CENT. CoDoF. cis. 30.1-26; 30.1-28 (1976 & Supp.
1983).
158. Mitchell, Involuntary Guardianshipfor Incompetents. A Strategy.br Legal Services Advocates, 12
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 451 (1978).

159. Note, In re Boyer. Guardianship of IncapacitatedAdults in Utah, UTAH L. REv. 427, 433-34
(1982).
160. Horstman, supra note 4, at 225-30. The Supreme Court of Utah recently examined the
UPC's definition of incapacity and concluded that it was overly vague since its undefined notion of
iesponsibility allowed the trier of fact to employ its own subjective concept of responsibility when
evaluating the proposed ward's ability to tmake or communicate decisions. In re Boyer, 636 P.2d
1085, 1088 (Utah 1981). The Utah court noted that the "responsible decisions" standard of the
UPC was overly broad since it permitted a guardian to be appointed for reasons unrelated to any
valid state interest. Id. The court indicated that the protection of the proposed ward fron injury to
himself (fdie to his impairment is the basic state interest justifying the appointment of a guardian. Id.
at 1089. The Boecourt construed the "responsible decisions" standard to require that the proposed
ward's decision Making process be so impaired that he is unable to care tr his safety or unable to
attend toi and provide for such necessities as food. shelter. clothing, and medical care, without which
physical inJury i illness may occur." 1d
161. M itchell. supra note 158. at 456.
162. See N.D. CENT. CODEO 30.1-26-01 (1976).
163. Id.
164. See Note. supra note 159. at 434. The Utahl Supreme Ciurt sol(
('ollstriuitg "the responsible decisions" standard very narrowly. Id.
tiftli ret mi;in. ('oipctence .hart
ein o Otherwim,. 4 kit'L . tie L.. .\ti PsYi(:[.

166. Id.

this problen
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legislative enactments. 167 Using this test, a court would be required
to sustain a proposed ward's decision when the ward provides a
court itself can
recognizable premise for the decision or if the 168
identify a rational reason for the person's decision.
The problem of what considerations a court should utilize in
determining whether a person is incompetent is not susceptible to
easy answers. One solution is to require that the proposed ward's
ability to decide be so impaired that he is unable to care for his
personal safety or to attend to and provide for such necessities as
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care, without which physical
injury might occur. 169 This standard shifts the focus in
guardianship proceedings from the content of the proposed ward's
decision to evidence of conduct that threatens the vital personal
interests of the proposed ward. 17 0 Under this standard, the cause or
source of the person's disability is of little significance;
consequently, the implied statutory requirement that the source of
incapacity be identified is unnecessary.1 7 1 Other commentators
have opposed standards based on either the reasonableness or
rationality of a person's decisions and have suggested that if a
person can hear a question and respond, his decision should be
72

honored. 1

Neither the UPC's "responsille decisions" standard, which
allows the appointment of a guardian simply because the court
disagrees with the substance of the proposed ward's decision, nor
the extreme position that any decision should be honored is
acceptable.' 7 3 The UPC standard permits the appointment of a full
guardian for a mildly retarded woman, 7 4 while a standard looking
167. Ser Regan. upra ote 6 and aitompanying
itext.
168. Regan, supra notic6.
169. In re Bover. 636 P.2d 1085. 1089 (Utah 1981).
170. Id. at 1088-89.
171. Id
172. Friedman. Leal Regulation of Applied Beha'ior Analysis in Alental Institutions
and Prisons, 17
ARIz. L. RF-,%x.
39, 78-80 (1975). The right to refuse medical treattoent is a particularly diflicut
pro bletti whether the patient is involuntarily committed or tmierely a resident of an institution such as
a tiirsing home. Sonic psychologists atrgue that the psychiatric patient's refusal of'treatment is
c.'i
(lenc of, the patient's mental illness
rather than a valid exercise of civilrights. White & W hite,
Inioluntarr CoimiiiittedPatients ' ConititutioialR1 i&ht
toRefuse Trea'nt,nn. 36 Am. Ps-c ti.
954 960 ( 1981 ).
173. Se In re Boyer. 636 P.2d 1085. 1089 (Utalh 1981) (incompetency determination can be
miade oily if "putatisv
Ward's ilecision-tiaking is so impaired that he is unable to care lot his
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only to the ability to make a decision regardless of rationality would
have prevented the appointment of a guardian for an elderly recluse
in danger of dying because of a serious condition of gangrene. 17 5
B.

PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

Guardianship has traditionally been considered a benevolent
action by the petitioner and the state; nevertheless, guardianship
strips personal and legal autonomy from the ward and vests it in the
court and the court appointed guardian. 17 6 A declaration of
incompetency or incapacity and the appointment of a full guardian
reduces the ward to the status of a child under the law.1 77 Although
the right to control property, to determine where to live, and to
consent to medical treatment are at stake, the strict procedural
safeguards accorded criminal defendants are not always extended
to guardianship proceedings. 178 Under its parens patriae power, the
state has a legitimate interest in protecting persons who are unable
to care for themselves. 17 9 Consequently, the state also has an
interest in not creating too many obstacles in the appointment of
guardians. 180
In the realm of civil proceedings, the requirements of due
process depend upon the particular situation and the rights
involved. 18 1 Although the United State Supreme Court has not yet
determined what procedural safeguards are necessary in
guardianship proceedings, the Court has rejected the criminal-civil
distinction in examining the substance of juvenile delinquency
proceedings. 182 Its decisions in the areas of juvenile proceedings 183
175. Northern v. State Dep't. of Human Serv., 575 S.W.2d 946, 946-47 (Tenn. 1978).
176. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 30.1-28-12 (1976 & Supp. 1983). In addition the limited
guardianship amendments require the appointing court to make a specific finding to determine
whether the incapacitated person is mentally incompetent to vote. Id. § 30.1-28-04 (Supp. 1983).
177. See id. § 30.1-28-12 (1976 & Supp. 1983). Section 30.1-28-12 reads as follows: "A guardian
of an incapacitated person has the same powers, rights, and duties respecting his ward that a parent has
respecting his unemancipatedminor child except that a guardian is not liable to third persons for acts of the
ward solely by reason of the parental relationship." Id. (emphasis added). The comment following
section 30.1-28-04 also contains the parent-child analogy: "a guardian, having custody, might
arrange for a voluntary care arrangement like that which a parentfor a minor and incapacitatedchild could
establish." Id. § 30.1-28-04 (1976) (editorial board comment) (emphasis added).
178. Horstman, supra note 4, at 236-37. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-12 (1976 & Supp.
1983).
179. Sherman, supra note 8, at 358.
180. Id. See Schmidt, supra note 2, at 191-92 (discussion of shortage of private guardians for
persons who are legally incompetent).
181. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (social security disability benefits);
Coss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-79 (1975) (public school suspension); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (parole revocation).
182. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967) (due process applies in juvenile delinquency
proceedings that may result in commitment to a state institution).
183. Id.
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and commitment proceedings' 84 indicate that certain procedural
safeguards must be followed in proceedings when a person could be
deprived of either property or liberty. This section will focus on
some of the aspects of procedural due process in the context of
guardianship proceedings.
1. Notice
The UPC requires that notice be served personally on the
allegedly incapacitated person, his spouse, and parents if they can
be found within the state. 8 5 Notice to the spouse and parents, if
they cannot be located within the state, can be by mail or
publication. 186 Notice to the proposed ward must be by personal
service and cannot be waived unless the proposed ward attends the
guardianship hearing or his waiver of notice is confirmed in an
interview with the court appointed visitor. 8 7 The notice provision
also provides that representation of the proposed ward, whom the
petitioner alleges is not capable of making responsible decisions
concerning his own person, by a guardian ad litem is not necessary
for the waiver of notice to be effective. 188
The general notice provision of the UPC specifies the content
of the notice. 1 89 A copy of the petition is not specifically required;
notice of the time and place of hearing satisfies the minimal
requirements. 90 The UPC's notice requirement does not alert the
allegedly incapacitated person to the serious legal and personal
consequences of a hearing on the issues of incapacity, disability,
and the appointment of a guardian or conservator and thus, could
violate procedural due process due to inadequacy of notice. 191
In Dale v. Hahn 92 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
184. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (clear and convincing standard of evidence
required in civil commitment proceedings).
185. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-09(2)(1976).
186. Id. See also id. § 30.1-03-01 (1) (a), (c) (general notice provisions of the UPC governing
notice by mail and publication).
187. Id. § 30.1-28-09(2).
188. Id. Permitting a valid waiver of notice in an action based on the proposed ward's lack of
capacity to make responsible decisions seemingly would be inconsistent. The UPC does, however,
require that the waiver of notice be confirmed by the court appointed visitor. See id.
189. Section 30.1-03-01 is the general notice provision for the Century Code and provides in
relevant part:
If notice of a hearing on any petition is required... the petitioner shall cause notice of
the time and place of hearing of any petition to be given to any interested person or his
attorney if he has appeared by attorney or requested that notice be sent to his attorney.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30. 1-03-01(l) (1976).
190. Id.
191. See id. See supra note 83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutionality of
the notice.
192. 486 F.2d 76 (2d. Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub noma., Dale v. Miller, 419 U.S. 826 (1974). In
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noted that the state was not serving notice on an ordinary party to a
civil suit when the defendant was committed to a state hospital as
an incompetent.' 93 The Dale court indicated that even personal
service may not be sufficient for an alleged incompetent person
unless the notice is reasonably calculated, under the circumstances,
to inform an incompetent person of the nature of the proceeding
and the substantial interests involved. 194 This casts a shadow on the
use of guardianship by state mental hospitals to authorize medical
treatment for incompetent persons. 195 Since the personal and legal
consequences of guardianship are substantial, the type of notice
provided and its content should be carefully scrutinized by the
court. 196

2. Presence of the Proposed Ward at the Hearing
Although most states require that the proposed ward be
present for the guardianship hearing, the vast majority of these
states also permit the court to dispense with the requirement when
it would be in the best interests of the proposed ward. 197 The UPC
provides that "the person alleged to be incapacitated is entitled to
be present at the hearing in person" or by counsel. 1 98 This is,
however, not a requirement. 199 If the proposed ward does not have
counsel the court is required to appoint "an appropriate
Dale the plaintiff had previously been involuntarily committed to a state mental hospital. Dale v.
deniedsub norn., Dale v. Miller, 419 U.S. 826 (1974). The
Hahn, 486 F.2d 76, 77 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
Dale court affirmed a finding that the plaintiff, whose incompetency was known to the state in light of
the .cry nature of the proceeding, had not been adequately notified of the guardianship proceeding.
Id. But see Rud v. Dahl, 578 F.2d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 1978) (summons served on alleged incompetent
that included information as to pendency, time, date, and place of hearing together with petition that
revealed further information was sufficient to fulfill due process requirements).
193. 486 F.2d at 77.
194. Id.
denied, 404 U.S. 895 (1971). Winters
Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert.
195. See, e..g.,
involved an involuntarily committed woman, who was a Christian Scientist, protesting forced
medication. Id. at 67-68. The court determined that even a mentally ill person, absent a finding of
incompetency, may refuse treatment but suggested that forced treatment would be acceptable if the
state were acting asparenspatriaefor a person adjudicated incompetent:
While itmay be true that the state could validly undertake to treat Miss Winters if it
did stand in a parens patriaerelationship to her and such a relationship may be created if
and when a person is found legally incompetent, there was never any effort on the part
of appellees to secure such ajudicial determination of incompetency before proceeding
to treat Miss Winters in the way they thought would be "best" for her.
Id. at71.
The power to give or withhold consent for medical treatment on behalf of a ward is one of the
powers of a guardian. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-12(1) (c) (Supp. 1983). This section provides in
pertinent part: "A guardian may give any consents or approvals that may be necessary to enable the
ward to receive medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment, or service." Id.
196. Sherman, supra note 8, at 360-61.
197. Horstman, supra note 4, at 241.
i98. N.D. CENT. CODE S 30.1-28-03(3) (Supp. 1983).
199. Id.
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official" 20 0 or attorney to function as a guardian ad litem and
2 01
represent the proposed ward during the proceeding.
One court has held that, not withstanding the substantial
interests at stake, due process does not require the presence of the
proposed ward at the hearing; but only requires that a person be
given the opportunity to be present and be heard. 20 2 In the
analogous area of civil commitment, however, courts have,
indicated that the presence of the person to be committed is a
requirement that can be waived only after a judicial determination
that the person is competent to waive his rights or is too ill to
attend. 203
The absence of the proposed ward coupled with deficient
notice and the possibility of representation by a guardian ad litem
who is not an attorney makes it probable that the court will decide
the issues of the proposed ward's incapacity or incompetency
primarily on the basis of the petitioner's evidence and the written
statements submitted by the court appointed physician and
visitor. 20 4 Therefore, the absence of the proposed ward is a
circumstance that merits close judicial scrutiny.
200. Id. S 30.1-28-03 (2). "Appropriate officia" -is not defined b y the Century Code. During
the 1983 legislative session North Dakota's Department of Human Services estimated that the cost
of court appointed counsel for all allegedly incapacitated persons for whom guardianship may be
sought during the 1983-85 biennium was approximately $240,080, but a department spokesman
pointed out that "assuming it will be the practice of the courts to appoint 'appropriate officials' as
opposed to attorneys in these proceedings, there would be minimal fiscal impact." Limited
Guardianship, 1983: Hearings on H.B. 1057 Before the House AppropriationsComm., 48th N.D. Leg. (1983)
(statement of Wayne Anderson, Dep't. of' Human Serv.)
201. Commentators have raised serious doubts concerning the effectivenes of a guardian ad
litem to act as an advocate on behalf of his ward. See Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEX. L. REv. 424 (1966).
Studies reveal that few proposed wards ever attend their guardianship hearing. G. ALEXANDER
& T. LEwIs, THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURROGATE MANAGEMENT 25 (1972). One reason
frequently cited is the opinion of medical experts that such hearings are traumatic experiences that
are detrimental to health ofa patient. Horstman, supra note 4, at 242 n. 116.
202. See Rud v. Dahl, 578 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1978). The court in Rud stated:
It is true that in some quasi-criminal, as well as criminal proceedings, a defendant's
actual presence in court is deemed a constituent element of due process. (citations
omitted). This, however, results in large measure from the force of the Sixth
Amendment, as incorporated in the due process clause, which by its own terms applies
only to criminal proceedings. Apart from Specht, which involved a special sentencing
proceeding following on the heels of a criminal conviction, the Supreme Court has
never held that a civil proceeding requires the presence of the respondent as an
element of due process. We are unpersuaded that the Court would extend its Specht
holding outside the quasi-criminal context in which it arose, notwithstanding the
substantial liberty interests implicated by an incompetency proceeding.
Id. at 678.
203. See, e.g., Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii 1976) (certain
nonconsensual commitment provisions and authorization provisions of Hawaii's mental health,
mental illness, drug addiction, and alcoholism law as written and applied did not provide sufficient
due process).
204. The court appointed physician and visitor are required to submit written reports to thfe
court. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 30.1-28-03 (Supp. 1983). Even though the proposed ward has a right to
cross-examine the physician and visitor it is doubtful if they will be present and available for cross-
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3. The Right to Counsel
North Dakota's guardianship statute provides that a proposed
ward has the right to be represented by counsel and to be present by
counsel at a guardianship proceeding. 20 5 If the proposed ward does
not have his own attorney, the court is required to appoint an
"appropriate official or attorney, who shall have the powers and
20 6
duties of a guardian ad litem."o
The appointment of a guardian ad litem prior to a
determination of the proposed ward's ability to make responsible
decisions for himself presents a catch-22 situation for a person
unable to afford his own attorney to advocate his personal desires,
not merely his best interests as perceived by a third party.2 0 7 There
are undoubtedly cases when the appointment of a guardian ad
litem is necessary; nevertheless, it is unlikely that every allegedly
incapacitated person is unable to determine his own best interests
208
without assistance of a guardian ad litem.
The requirement of counsel bears a direct relationship to the
exarmination unless a subpoena is issued or an advance request is made. In addition, there may also
be a conflict of interest. The Department of Human Services indicated that it intended to attempt to
have personnel from (rafton and San Haven appointed to serve as court appointed visitors and
physicians in guardianship proceedings for residents of those institutions. Limited Guardianship, 1983:
Hearings on H.B. 1057 Before the House Appropriations Comm., 48th N.D. Leg. (1983) (statement of
Wayne Anderson, Dep't. of Human Serv.).
205. N.D. CENT. ConE g 30.1-28-03(3) (Supp. 1983).
206. Id. § 30.1-28-03(2).
207. See, e.g., Quesnell v. State, 517 P.2d 568 (Wash. 1973). In Quesnell "assistance of counsel"
was woefully lacking. Id. at 575. The individual charged with mental illness was provided
"assistance of counsel" to the extent he had a fifteen minute conversation with the person charged to
represent him at the hearing. Id. For representation to be meaningful, the guardian ad litem must
provide the individual with adversarial services in the involuntary civil commitment proceedings. Id.
See a/so Aho v. Rhodes. 347 N.E.2d 647. 383 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1976). In Aho, the nonadversarial role of
a guardian ad liteti was described as follows:
A guardian ad litem may of necessity be obligated to act contrary to the desires of the
incompetent and to adopt a position adverse to that urged by his ward. In the
discharge of his objective responsibility the guardian may conclude that the best
interest of the incompetent would not be served by prosecuting an appeal ... 1']jhe
wishes of the ward will be relevant but not determinative.
Id. at 650-51, 383 N.Y.S. 2d at 288.
As previously noted. the UPC has been amended to require representation by counsel, who is
not assigned the role of guardian ad litem unless the court deems it necessary. See supra note 200.
The Model Guardianship and Conservatorship Act, prepared tinder the auspices of the American
Bar Association's Commission on the Mentally Disabled, requires the appointment of counsel for the
proposed ward, but it also pro%ides for the appointment of a separate guardian ad litem if the
proposed ward's disability prevents him from determining his own interests without assistance. See 3
MENst..i- DIss.- L. REP. 264. 283-85 (reprint of NIodel Guardianship and Conservatorship act).
208. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 30.1-28-03(2) (1976). Section 30.1-28-03(2) pro\ ides in relevant part:
Upon the filing of t petition, the court shall set a date for hearing on the issues of
incapacity and unless the allegedly incapacitated person has counsel ofhis own choice,
it shall appoint an appropriate official or attorney to represent him in the proceeding,
s ho shall have the powers and duties of a guardian ad litem.
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accuracy of the fact finding process. 0 9 In addition, the requirement
that counsel be appointed or expressly waived has been extended to
other civil proceedings. 2 10 The United States Supreme Court,
basing its decision on the due process clause, extended the right to
counsel to juvenile proceedings. 211 In a case involving the
involuntary commitment of a mentally retarded person to a state
hospital the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
concluded that it does not matter whether the proceedings are
labeled "civil" or "criminal" or whether they are concerned with
mental incompetence or juvenile delinquency. 2 12 Rather, it is the.
possibility of involuntary incarceration that mandates the
observance of the constitutional safeguards of due process,
including the duty to see that a person facing an involuntary
commitment proceeding is provided the opportunity to secure the
2 13
assistance of legal counsel at every step of the proceedings.
The concepts articulated by the Supreme Court and the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals appear to be applicable to guardianship
proceedings and to mandate that the right to counsel be extended
since the intrusion on a ward's liberty interests are extensive when
the ward is adjudicated incompetent. 2 14 Nevertheless, in Rud v.
Dahl2' 5 the court determined that "the nature of the intrusion on
209. See Sherman, supra note 8, at 361-64. Sherman argues that since the prospective ward is
often disabled and unable to adequately protect his interests, it is imperative that counsel be
appointed for all respondents in guardianship proceedings. Id. at 361. The writer also indicates that
there may be a constitutional right to counsel, based on the dcue process clause of the federal
constitution. Id. But see Rud v. Dahl, 578 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1978). Although the court in Rud
recognized that the appointment of counsel was closely related to the accuracy of the fact finding
process, the court held that counsel was not constitutionally required at guardianship proceedings.
Id. at 678-79.
210. In re Gatlt. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) juvenile court proceeding): Heryford v. Parker. 396 F.2d
393 (10th Cir. 1968) (involuntary commitment).
211. In re Gaut. 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). In the context of juvenile court proceedings when the
liberty of the Juvenile is threatened, the Supreme Court concluded the juvenile "needs the assistance
of couLnsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon
regularity f hileproceedings, and to ascertain whether lie has a defense and to prepare and submit
it.
Id.
212. Hervfoicd v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393. 396 (10th Cir. 1968). Herford involved an application
by a iiither to have her minor child committed to a state school lot retarded persons. Id. at 395. The
state staltte provided t w lie appointnent of it guardian ad liten ) repct sent rthc. lisor olk- if lie did
not have a paent onrgitardian. Id. at 394. Later, i habeas corpus petition Was filed alleging that the
tinor hic it constitutional right to the assistance ofcounsel at the hearing. Id. at 395. After rejecting
the state's assertion thia the rationale of Gault s,,as not applicable, the appellate 'outrt stated. "Ljike
Gaiit. anc ndtutinost importance. v,'e have a situation in which the liberty of an individual is at stake,
and we think the reasoning in Gault emphatically applies.- Id. at 396.
213. Id.
214. Horstnian. supra note 4. at 244-51.
215. 578 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1978). In Rud. the plaintiff. an 81-year-old resident of a nursing
home, Was served with ta s o n soisto appear at a hearing on a petition to appoint a conservator for
him. Rtid \-. Dahl. 578 F.2d 674, 676 (7th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff did not respond to the suinmons
and did not appear at the hearing either in person or by counsel. Id. No inquiry Was made into the
reasons for the plaintiff s absence. nor ".as couisel appointed to represent his interests at the
proceeding, Id. On the basis of the petition and a physician's affidavit that alleged the plaintiff*was
physically and mentalls\ incapable of nanaging his pe'rson and estateccue to congestive heart ailure.
punlmonary fibrosis. generalized arteriosclerosis. and cerebral dtnetstia,. lie court determined that
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liberty interests resulting from an adjudication of incompetency is
far less severe than the intrusion resulting from other types of
proceedings in which the presence of, counsel has been
mandated.' '216 The court also indicated that the skills of an
attorney are less important at an incompetency hearing than at
other judicial proceedings since the procedural and evidentiary
rules are "considerably less strict than those applicable in other
types of civil and criminal proceedings." 217 Furthermore, the court
noted that the costs of mandatory appointment of counsel would
undermine the protection of the limited resources of the
incompetent's estate from dissipation. 218 The basis for this
conclusion was the court's determination that "few alleged
incompetents will be able to effect a 'knowing and intelligent'
waiver of undesired counsel. "219 This is a startling statement from
a court that had previously rejected a similar argument by the same
plaintiff challenging the adequacy of the notice provided by the
22 0
Illinois guardianship statute.
Rud v. Dahl may be more limited than it appears at first
glance. 22' The Rud court indicated its belief that, given the notice
actually provided, there were no set of facts that the plaintiff could
prove at trial rendering the notice constitutionally deficient. 222 The
court also noted that the plaintiff had neither alleged that he did not
understand the notice nor had he provided the court a statement of
223
any circumstances challenging the reasonableness of the notice.
In addition, the court prefaced its analysis of the contention that the
statutory scheme was deficient because it did not require that a
guardian ad litem be appointed by noting that the plaintiff did not
claim that the statute denied him the right to be represented by
counsel if he elected to be represented. 2 24 The Rud court then
the plaintiff was incompetent. Id The plaintiff subsequently brought suit under 42 U.S.C. S 1983,
challenging the facial constitutionality of the statutory scheme under which he was adjudicated
incompetent and a conservator was appointed to manage his person and estate. Id. at 675. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the notice was sufficient on its face as a matter of due
process, that the plaintiff was not denied due process because the adjudication of incompetency
proceeded in his absence, and that the statutory scheme was not constitutionally deficient because it
did not require that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent the rights of alleged incompetents
at incompetency hearings. Id. at 678-79.
216. Id. at 679.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 677.
221. See supra note 83 for a discussion of the uncertainty for the basis of the court's decision in
Rud.
222. 578 F.2d at 678.
223. Id.at 677-78.
224. Id. at 678. The concurring opinion also indicates that the decision of the Rud court was
based to a large degree on the deficiencies of the plaintiff's complaint:

19841

SPECIAL PROJECT

rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the state was constitutionally
required to appoint counsel even when not requested by an alleged
incompetent and that no adjudication of incompetency could take
place in the absence of counsel or a valid waiver of the right of
counsel.2 2 5
In cases that have applied the juvenile court proceeding
analysis to involuntary civil commitment proceedings, there has
been a state appointed prosecutor.2 26 When the state is able to
marshall its resources against an individual, the situation is
fundamentally unfair and weighted against the individual when
counsel is not appointed. 2 27 In guardianship proceedings, there is
usually no prosecutor. 228 Instead, the proposed ward typically
confronts another private party, who may be represented by
counsel. 229 Nevertheless, one may argue that the right to counsel
arises not merely because of the presence of the prosecutor but to
correct the imbalance existing between the parties and to protect
23 0
the liberty interests at issue in the proceeding.
Under North Dakota's involuntary commitment statute, a
respondent facing involuntary commitment is granted the right to
appointment of counsel. 231 Although a finding that a person is
"incapacitated" and in need of a guardian does not mean that the
He neither alleges nor contends that he did not receive and understand the process and
notice of the hearing or that his failure to attend the hearing or to engage an attorney
was not the result of an informed and voluntary decision. Nor has he alleged that he
was not in fact legally incompetent at the time he was so adjudicated.
Id. at 679 (Tone,J., concurring).
225. Id. at 678.
226. See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 394-95 (10th Cir. 1968).
227. In reGault, 387 U.S. 1,34-42 (1967).
228. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 30.1-28-03 (Supp. 1983). Section 3 of the 1983 Limited
Guardianship Act, however, requires: "Court proceedings for the appointment of a guardian for an
individual presently or formerly a ward of the superintendent of the Grafton State School pursuant to
this section must, upon request of the petitioner, be handled by the state's attorney of the county in
which the action is brought." Id. § 25-04-13.1.
In addition, 5 2 of the 1983 Limited Guardianship Act' requirements that individualized
habilitation plans for developmentally disabled persons must:
State whether the developmentally disabled person appears to need a guardian and
determine the type of protection needed by the individual based on the individual's
actual mental and adaptive limitations and other conditions which may warrant the
appointment of a guardian. Any member of the individual habilitation plan team may
petition, or notify any interested person of the need to petition, for a finding of
incapacity and appointment of a guardian.
Id. 525-01.2-14(7).
Thus, the new guardianship amendments increase the amount of state involvement in the
guardianship process when the proposed ward is a developmentally disabled person.
229. See id § 30.1-28-03. Even if the petitioner is not represented by counsel, there is an
inherent unfairness if counsel is not appointed to assist an individual when the basis of the action is
the individual's alleged inability to make responsible decisions concerning his personal welfare. See
Mitchell, supra note 11, at 1419.
230. Sherman, supra note 8, at 361-64.
231. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-13 (Supp. 1983).
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person is mentally ill and can be committed, the potential loss of
liberty and autonomy is substantial. 2 2 In addition to being
stigmatized as incompetent to manage his own affairs, the ward can
be involuntarily placed in a nursing home. 23 3 While nursing homes
are not prisons or mental hospitals, they are similar in that they are
places of residence in which similarly situated persons lead enclosed
lives that are formally administered by the institution itself. 234 In
effect, the ward becomes an inmate of that institution. 235 The
appointment of a guardian strips the ward of the power to
consent. 236 Furthermore, if the appointing court determines that
the person is incompetent, the person loses his right to vote. 237 To
refuse the right to counsel on the contention that the nature of the
intrusion on liberty interests is less severe in guardianship
proceedings than the intrusion resulting from civil commitment
238
proceedings, therefore, is unrealistic.
A more difficult question is the proper role of counsel in
guardianship proceedings. If a client's capacity to make competent
decisions is being challenged, an attorney may be reluctant to
zealously advocate his client's wishes.2 40 The nature of a
guardianship proceeding in which the ostensible purpose is to
promote the best interests of the proposed ward may persuade an
attorney not to actively oppose the petition.2 4 1 In the context of
involuntary commitment proceedings, courts have held that the
presence of a guardian ad litem does not satisfy the requirement of
representation by counsel and that, if requested by his client, an
232. See Horstman, supra note 4, at 231-35.
233. N.D. CENT. CODE S 30.1-28-12(1) (a) (Supp. 1983). Section 30.1-28-12(1) (a) provides:
To the extent that it is consistent with the terms of any order by a court of competent
jurisdiction relating to detention or commitment of the ward, [the guardian] is entitled
to custody of the person of his ward and may establish the ward's place of abode within
or without this state.
Id. The nursing home environment is often nontherapeutic, and patients are likely to deteriorate and
become increasingly less able to leave the nursing home the longer they remain. KANE, ALTERNATIVES
TO INSTITUTIONAL CARE OF THE ELDERLY, H.

R.

Doc. No. 165, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 398 (1980).

Furthermore, few nursing homes provide services to encourage independent living; custodial care
rather than rehabilitative care is the norm in most nursing homes. Id. at 399.
234. E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 1, 1 (1961).
235. M. WEINER, A. UROK, & A. SNADOWSKY, THE INSTITUTIONALIZED AGED, WORKING WITH
THE AGED 56-57 (1978).

236. See Mitchell, supra note 11, at 1434. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-12 (Supp. 1983).
237. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-04 (Supp. 1983).
238. See Horstman, supra note 4, at 231-35.
240. Mitchell, supra note 11, at 1433. A Wisconsin judge found that attorneys representing
respondents in involuntary commitment hearings waived the right to file habeas corpus petitions in
99% of 838 examined cases, the right tojury trial in 99% of838 cases, and the right to appeal in 99%
of 838 cases. Memmel v. Mundy, No. 441417 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee County, Wis., Aug. 18, 1976)
(mem. decision), appeal dismissed as moot, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977) (findings reprinted
by Mitchell, supra note II at 1433).
241. See Mitchell, supra note 11, at 1433.
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attorney, must take an adversary

position. 24 2 Both the recent

amendments to the UPC and the Model Guardianship and
Conservatorship Act indicate that the attorney should represent the
interests of the client as determined by the client, not the
attorney. 243 The role of the attorney in guardianship proceedings is
more clearly defined by the Model Act since it provides for the
appointment of a separate guardian ad litem when the proposed
24 4
ward is unable to determine his own interests.
4. Standardof Proof
As a result of being treated as a civil proceeding and the silence
of the North Dakota Century Code regarding the standard of proof
required for a determination of incompetency or incapacity in
guardianship proceedings, North Dakota courts have permitted a
finding of incompetency based upon a preponderance of
evidence.

245

appropriate,

The

traditional

however,

in

civil law

standard

guardianship

246
substantial liberty interests are at stake.

may

not be

proceedings

when

When the Utah Supreme Court considered this issue, it
determined that clear and convincing evidence of incompetency
was necessary to minimize error in guardianship cases.

24 7

It

rejected the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard after
concluding that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard would
undermine the purposes of Utah's guardianship statutes. 248 In
contrast, a "preponderance of the evidence" standard would not,
the court determined, provide adequate protection for the interests
242. See supra note 207 and accompanying text for a discussion of wnat constitutes sufficient
assistance of counsel.
243. The Model Guardianship and Conservatorship Act S 3091).provides: "Itihe principal duty
of an attorney representing the subject of an intervention proceeding is to represent zealously that
individual's legitimate interests." (reprinted in 3 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 264, 284 (1979)).
244. See 3 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 264, 285 (1979) (reprint of Model Guardianship and
Conservatorship act § 31 (4)).
245. See, e.g., In re Thoreson's Guardianship, 72 N.D. 101, 107, 4 N.W.2d 822,
i9I2)
(court determined that findings by the trial court were in accord with the "weight" of the evidence).
246. Cf Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1978) (involuntary civil commitment must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence).
247. See In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1091-92 (Utah 1981). The Boyer court considered an appeal
from an order appointing a guardian for a 39-year-old woman who had a mild degree of mental
retardation. Id. at 1086. The Letters of Guardianship did not iet any limits to the powers of the
guardian. Id. at 1087. The court construed Utah's guardianship statute - Utah was one of the states
that had adopted the Uniform Probate Code, including its guardianship provisions - to limit the
circumstances under which a guardian for an incapacitated adult may be appointed. Id. at 1089-92.
The court determined that a guardianship may be imposed only when it is shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the proposed ward's health or safety is endangered. Id. The Boyer court also
concluded that the guardian's powers must be limited to those necessary to protect the ward's health
and safety. Id. at 1091.
248. Id. The Boyer court rejected the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard after it determined
that such a standard would "tend to frustrate the beneficial purposes of the act by making a guardian
unavailable to persons needing only a limited degree of supervision." Id. at 1091.
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of the ward.2 49 After considering the individual interests at stake in
guardianship proceedings 250 and noting the similarity in the
interests in guardianship cases and commitment cases, the court
concluded that the higher standard of "clear and convincing"
should also govern in guardianship cases as it did in commitment
cases.

25 1

In the context of involuntary commitment, when more is at
stake than economic interests, courts have frequently required
standards of proof higher than a "preponderance of the
evidence. "252 The United States Supreme Court has also
concluded that due process requires a standard of proof greater
than a mere preponderance of the evidence in commitment cases,
but that the standard of proof need not be "beyond a reasonable
doubt. "253 Furthermore, some states, by statute, require proof of
2 54
incompetency or incapacity by clear and convincing evidence.
North Dakota's involuntary treatment and commitment statutes
also require that a petition be sustained by clear and convincing
evidence.255
249. Id.at 1091-92.
250. Id.at 1091.
251. Id.at 1092.
252. See, e.g., Stamus v. Leonard, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976) ("clear and convincing"
standard of proof is necessary for involuntary commitment); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509
(D. Neb. 1975) (in civil commitment proceedings, standard of"proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is
not constitutionally required, but "clear and convincing" standard is necessary because of loss of
liberty and attendant stigmatization of involuntary commitment and a find of mental illness); In re
Stephanson, 67 Ill.
2d 544, 10 111. Dec. 507, 367 N.E.2d. 1273 (1977) (appropriate standard of proof
in involuntary civil commitment proceedings is clear and convincing evidence); In re Valdez, 88
N.M. 338, 540 P.2d 818 (1975) (standard of proof to be applied in civil commitment proceedings is
"clear and convincing" evidence).
253. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1978). In Addington the appellant's mother filed a
petition for his indefinite commitment to a state mental hospital. Id. at 420. The trial court instructed
the jury to determine whether the appellant was mentally ill and required hospitalization, based on
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. Id. at 421. Although the appellant conceded that he
was mentally ill, he argued that there was no substantial basis for deciding that he was dangerous to
either himself or others. Id. The Texas Supreme Court reversed a lower appellate court's decision
that decided any standard of proof less than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard violated the
appellant's procedural due process rights. Id. at 421-22. The Texas Supreme Court held that a
"preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof satisfied due process in a civil commitment
proceeding. Id. at 422. The United States Supreme Court concluded that the standard of proof in
civil commitment cases must be greater than the "preponderance of the evidence" standard used in
other civil cases but that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was not required. Id. at 431-33.
254. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. S 525.551 (3) (West Supp. 1983). This section provides that
"[t]he proposed ward or conservatee has the right to summon and cross-examine witnesses. The
rules of evidence apply. In the proceedings, there is a legal presumption of capacity and the burden
of proof is on the petitioner. The standard of proof is-that ofclear and convincing evidence." Id. See
also NEB. REV. STAT. S 30-2620 (Cum. Supp. 1982). Section 30-2620 provides in relevant part:
The court may appoint a guardian as requested if it is satisfied by clear and convincing
evidence that the person for whom a guardian is sought is incapacitated and that the
appointment is necessary or desirable as a means of providing continuing care or
supervision of the person of the incapacitated person.

Id.
255. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-19 (Supp. 1983). Section 25-03.1-19 reads in part:
There shall be a presumption in favor of the respondent, and the burden of proof in
support of the petition shall be upon the petitioner.
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When North Dakota's guardianship statutes were amended by
the 1983 legislature to provide for limited guardianship, the statute
was also amended to require the appointing court to determine
whether a ward is mentally incompetent and thus not qualified to
vote.256

Support for the proposition that the states may specify the
qualifications of voters in state and federal elections is found in
article I, section 2 of the federal constitution and the seventeenth
amendment to the federal constitution. 25 7 Absent discrimination
forbidden by the federal constitution, the states have broad powers
to determine the qualifications of voters. 258 The United States
Supreme Court has described the right to vote as a fundamental
political right, because it is preservative of all rights.2 59 Thus, a
state statute or constitutional provision that infringes upon the
exercise of the right to vote is invalid unless the state meets the
burden of proving that the restriction is narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling state interest. 260 The test contains two steps:
first, the exclusion must be necessary to promote the state's
articulated interest; and second, the interest itself must be
compelling. 261 Courts have indicated that the exclusion of mentally
incompetent voters is necessary to promote the state interest in
having a rational electorate.

262

If, upon completion of the hearing, the court finds that the petition has not been
sustained by clear and convincing evidence, it shall deny the petition, terminate the
proceeding, and order that the respondent be discharged if he has been hospitalized
prior to the hearing.
Id.
256. See id. § 30.1-28-04 (Supp. 1983).
257. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2; amend. XVII.
258. SeeAnnot. 80 A.L.R.3D 1116, 1119 (1978).
259. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). In Yick Wo, the Court determined that a
San Francisco laundry ordinance was void under the fourteenth amendment because it was
administered to discriminate against Chinese subjects. Id. at 373-74. Writing for the Court, Justice
Matthews identified the political franchise of voting as an example of a fundamental right: "Though
not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society... nevertheless
it is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights." Id. at 370.
260. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). The court in Kramer held
that a New York statute, which permitted the inclusion of many persons having only a remote and
indirect interest in school affairs while excluding others having a distinct and direct interest, violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 632-33.
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., Manhatten State Citizens Group, Inc. v. Bass, 524 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (New York statute, prohibiting adjudged incompetents or those involuntarily committed to
mental institutions from voting, was unconstitutional only as applied to persons involuntarily
committed to hospitals but not adjudged incompetent); Boyd v. Board of Registration of Voters of
Belchertown, 334 N.E.2d 629 (Mass. 1975) (residents of state facility for the mentally retarded were
not ineligible to vote unless adjudicated incompetent or under guardianship in accordance with
statutory procedures); Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa Falls, 70 Wis. 2d 610, 235 N.W.2d
435 (1975) (signatures of residents of state facility for mentally retarded were not necessary on an
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When courts determine that disqualification statutes based
upon mental incompetency are unconstitutional under either a
state constitution or the federal constitution, a key factor has been
the absence of a judicial determination of the elector's mental
incompetence. 263 Courts have refused to allow a presumption of
incompetence from the mere fact of residency in a state
institution. 264 In contrast, North Dakota's constitution provides
that "no person who has been declared mentally incompetent by
order of a court or other authority having jurisdiction, which
order has not been rescinded shall be qualified to vote. "265
Similarly, the North Dakota electors' statute provides that a
person who is under guardianship, non compos mentis, or insane shall
not be qualified to vote. 266 The statute limits the disqualification to
instances in which the person has a court appointed guardian,
appointed "upon a finding of incompetence or incapacitation due
to mental illness or defect. "267 The language of the electors' statute
is more restrictive than that of the constitution since it would only
disqualify those persons whose incompetence results from illness or
mental defect. 268 In this instance, however, the language of the
constitutional provision controls since the legislature cannot
enlarge or diminish the qualifications necessary to entitle one to
annexaiion petition because state constitution and electors' statute intends that persons who are
mentally incapable of knowing or understanding nature and objective of election question should not
be eligible to vote).
263. See Carrol v. Cobb, 139 N.J. Super. 439, 354 A.2d 355 (1976).
264. Id. at __
, 354 A.2d at 363. See also N.D. CENT. CODE S 25-01.2-03 (Supp. 1983). Section
25-01.2-03 provides:
No developmentally disabled person shall be presumed to be incompetent or shall be
deprived of any constitutional, civil, or legal right solely because of admission to or
residence at an institution or facility or solely because of receipt of services for
developmentally disabled persons. However, nothing in this section shall be construed
to limit or modify section 16.1-01-04. The constitutional, civil, or legal rights which
may not be varied or modified under the provisions of this section include, but are not
limited to:
1.The right to vote at elections;
2. The free exercise of religion;
3. The right of reasonable opportunities to interact with members of the opposite
sex; and

4. The right to confidential handling of personal and medical records.
Id.
265. N.D. CONST. art. II, § 2.
266. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-01-04(5) (1981). Section 16.1-01-04(5) provides in relevant part:
Pursuant to section 2 of article II of the Constitution of North Dakota, no person who
is under guardianship, non compos mentis, or insane shall be qualified to vote at any
election. To be denied the right to vote under this subsection, a person must have a
guardian duly appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a finding of
incompetence or incapacitation due to mental illness or defect.
Id.
267. Id.
268. CompareN.D. CONST. art. II, § 2 with N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-04(5)(1981).
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vote at a constitutional election. 269
The limited guardianship bill amended section 30.1-28-04 of
the Century Code to require that the court "determine in all cases
in which a guardian is appointed whether the incapacitated person
' 270
is mentally competent and as such is not qualified to vote."
North Dakota's guardianship statute defines an incapacitated
person as follows:
any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness,
mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced
age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other
causes (except minority) to the extent that he lacks
sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate responsible decisions concerning
his
217 1
person.
Additionally,
a definition of "mental
incompetence"
is
conspicuously absent in the North Dakota Century Code and the
state constitution. Moreover, the North Dakota Supreme Court
has not defined the term in the context of voting. Courts should
consider the new provisions for limited guardianship in
determining whether a person is incompetent. The limited
guardianship concept recognizes that there are degrees of
incapacity or incompetence and requires the court to match the
guardian's authority with the incapacitated person's actual mental
and adaptive limitations. 27 2 Therefore, some individuals under
limited guardianships may be capable of making rational voting
choices.

D.

APPEAL, MODIFICATION, AND TERMINATION

The decree of the county court, the court of original
jurisdiction in guardianship and conservatorship matters, may be
appealed by any party to the proceeding or by any other person
who has or claims a right to interest in the subject matter of the

decree or order. 273
269.Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 16 N.D. 363, 368, 113 N.W. 1071, 1072 (1907).
270. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-04 (Supp. 1983).
271. Id. § 30.1-26-01(1) (1976).
272. See id. § 30.1-28-04(1) (Supp. 1983).
273. Id. § 30-26-01 (1976). Few decrees of incompetency and orders appointing guardians are
appealed unless there is a quarrel over the disposition of the ward's property. See, e.g., In re
Guardianship of Frank, 137 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1965) (dispute between children over sale of
farmland).
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Modification of the original guardianship order may be
necessary due to changes in the ward's condition. Either the ward
or another interested person may petition the county court in the
county where the ward resides or the appointing court to limit or
expand the authority previously conferred. 27 4 However, no
mandatory requirement for judicial review of guardianships
exists. 27 5 If the ward is a developmentally disabled person and
participates in programs and services for the developmentally
disabled, an IHP is required.2 76 The plan must state whether the
developmentally disabled person appears to need a guardian and
determine the type of protection needed based upon the
individual's actual mental and adaptive limitations. 2 77 The statute
also requires that the plan be reviewed and updated at least
annually. 27 8 Thus, there is at least a limited recognition that the
disabilities of individuals under guardianship are not necessarily
static.279

The authority and responsibility of a guardian terminates
upon the death of either the guardian or ward, the incapacity of the
guardian, or upon the removal or resignation of the guardian. 28 0 In
addition, if a guardian is not satisfactory the ward or any person
interested in the ward's welfare may petition for the guardian's
removal. 28 1 The statute provides that "the court may remove a

guardian and appoint a successor if in the best interests of the
ward. "282 Furthermore, the ward or a person interested in his
welfare may petition the court for an order that he is no longer
28 3
incapacitated and for removal or resignation of the guardian.
The request may be made by filing a petition or writing an
28 4
informal letter to either the county judge or the appointing court.
The original order may, however, specify a minimum period of one
30

28

274. N.D. CENT. CODE S
.1- -13(l) (Supp. 1983).
275. See id. ch. 30.1-28 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
276. Id. § 25-01.2-14 (1) (Supp. 1983). See supra note Ill and accompanying text for a definition
ofl HP.
277. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-01.2-14(7) (Supp. 1983).
278. Id. § 25-01.2-14(2).
279. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In O'Connor the United States Supreme
Court noted that states are under a continuing obligation to periodically review the justifications for
involuntary commitments. Id. at 574-75. This decision places a burden on the state to periodically
re-establish the basis for continuing confinement. Id. at 575.
Only ten states requirejudicial review of private guardianships and conservatorships. Sherman,
supra note 8, at 364 (footnote omitted).
280. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-06 (1976).
281. Id. 5 30.1-28-07(1).
282. Id. Section 30.1-28-07(1) authorizes the removal of a guardian and the appointment of a
successor if it is in the best interests of the ward. Id. The pre-1973 guardianship statute permitted the
removal of a guardian only upon satisfactory proof of the guardian's incompetency or cause. See
N.D.CENT. CODE S 30-12-02 (1960) (repealed 1973).
283. N.D. CENT. CODE S 30.1-28-07(2) (1976).
284. Id.
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year or less during which no petition for review may be filed
2 85
without special permission.
Despite the explicit provisions for terminating a guardianship,
it is unlikely that the ward will be successful. 286 To have his legal
capacity or competency restored, the ward must prove that he is no
longer incapacitated or incompetent. 287 This requires that the ward
overturn the presumption of incompetency resulting from the
,initial determination.2 88 This presumption tilts the scales against
the ward's success unless he manages to secure the support of a
third party. 28 9 In actions for termination, however, the burden
should be on the original petitioners or the state to demonstrate that
2 90
the ward is still incapacitated and in need of guardianship.
E.

PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP

In North Dakota, the county public administrator can be
appointed the legal guardian and conservator of the person and
estate of an incapacitated person when no other competent person
exists to act as guardian or conservator. 29 1 The public
administrator has the same powers and duties as a private guardian
or conservator.2 9 2 The compensation of the public administrator is
a percentage of the funds received from various agencies or from
the ward's estate. 293 Since the public administrator receives no
other compensation for his services, little incentive exists for him to
assist any of his wards in terminating their guardianships. While
there may be a limited justification for the appointment of the
public administrator as conservator, it is doubtful that an
29 4
appointment as guardian could be justified.
F.

DESIGNING THE LIMITED GUARDIANSHIP ORDER

Now that North Dakota's guardianship statute explicitly
285. Id.
286. Mitchell, supra note 11, at 1425-26.
287. Goetz v. Gunsch, 80 N.W.2d 548, 552 (N.D. 1956) (must show restoration to capacity to
overcome presumption of incapacity once declared incompetent).
288. Id.
289. See Mitchell, supra note 11, at 1426.
290. See Mitchell, supra note 5, at 455-56. The Model Guardianship and Conservatorship Act
requires a review hearing no more than six months after the appointment of a guardian or
conservator and annually thereafter. See 3 MENTAL DISAB. L. RE'. 264, 282 (1979) (reprint of the
Model Guardianship and Conservatorship Act).
291. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 11-21-05 (1976).
292. Id. S 11-21-06.
293. Id.§§ 11-21-08; 30.1-29-14.
294. Telephone conversation with S. M. Burdick, Public Administrator, Grand Forks County,
in G rand Forks, North Dakota (Sept. 26, 1983). One public administrator was convinced that he was
o)nlv a conservator and that the administrator of the nursing home in which his elderly ward resided
excised the powers of guardianship even though the court had appointed him guardian and
co'(mcrvamr a nuiber of years earlier. Id. In addition, he had never made a personal visit to his
ward. Id.
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allows a court to order a limited guardianship, the guardianship
order may be necessarily more complex and require the court to
295
specify the powers and duties of the guardian.
Initially, the court must evaluate the proposed ward's
incapacity. The Century Code provides some assistance by
requiring the appointment of a physician to examine the proposed
ward and a visitor to interview the proposed ward and the person
seeking appointment as the guardian. 296 The Century Code also
requires the visitor to inspect the present residence of the proposed
ward and the place where the proposed ward would live if a
guardian were appointed. 297 In addition, the court may utilize the
services of any public, charitable, or nonprofit corporation that is
willing to evaluate the condition of the proposed ward. 298 To

prevent the decision from being determined solely on the basis of
medical opinions, the court should consider the proposed ward's
past behavior concerning income, property, employment, medical
care, living arrangements, social and legal services, and family
relationships. 299 The court should also determine the activities with
which the proposed ward will need assistance.3 00
Next, if the court determines that the appointment of a
guardian is necessary, the court must match the responsibilities of
the guardian with the actual limitations of the ward. 30 1 The court
295. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 30.1-28-04(1) (Supp. 1983). The guardianship order will
necessarily be more complex since the powers of the guardian must be tailored to the actual mental
and adaptive limitations of each ward. Id.
296. MI3d§ 30.1-28-03 (2). Setion 30 1-28-03 (2) provides:
Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall set a date for hearing on the issues of
incapacity and unless the allegedly incapacitated person has counsel of his own choice,
it shall appoint an appropriate official or attorney to represent him in the proceeding,
who shall have the powers and duties of a guardian ad litem. The person alleged to be
incapacitated shall be examined by a physician appointed by the court who shall
submit his report in writing to the court and shall also be interviewed by a visitor sent
by the court. The visitor also shall interview the person seeking appointment as
guardian, and visit the present place of abode of the person alleged to be incapacitated
and the place it is proposed that lie will be detained or reside if the requested
appointment is made. The visitor shall submit his report in writing to the court.
Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. § 30.1-28-03(3).
299. Dussault, supra note 4, at 605-07.
300. See 3 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 264, 270 (1979) (reprint of the Model Guardianship and
Conservatorship Act).
301. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-04(1) (Supp. 1983). Section 30.1-28-04(1) provides in
pertinent part:
The court shall exercise the authority conferred in this chapter consistent with the
maximum self-reliance and independence of the incapacitated person and make
appointive and other orders only to the extent necessitated by the incapacitated
person's actual mental and adaptive limitations or other conditions warranting the
procedure.
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order should indicate those life areas that the ward is capable of
handling by himself, those that require the concurrence of the
guardian, and those for which the guardian is assigned sole
responsibility. 30 2 Since it is improbable that an order could
anticipate every situation, the order should require the guardian to
promote the maximum self-reliance and independence of the
ward.

303

Finally, the court should determine the effect of the limited
guardianship order on the ward's right to vote. 30 4 To prevent any
confusion concerning the powers transferred to the guardian, the
court should also indicate that some rights are of such a
fundamental or personal nature that they cannot be exercised by
the guardian on the ward's behalf. 30 5 Although some of these

problematic powers are discussed in more detail in the next section,
a few examples would include non-therapeutic surgery,
sterilization, voting, marriage, and voluntary admission to
treatment facilities. In these areas, prior court approval should be
secured to permit the guardian to supply proxy consent. 30 6
IV. PROBLEMATIC POWERS OF GUARDIANSHIP
A.

MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND ANNULMENT

The North Dakota Century Code defines marriage as a
"personal relationship arising out of a civil contract between a male
and female to which the consent of the parties is essential. The marriage
relation shall be entered into, maintained, annulled, or dissolved
only as provided by law." ,307 Consent of the parties to the marriage
is required. In Johnson v. Johnson 0 8a the North Dakota Supreme
302. See 3 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 264, 272 (1979) (reprint of the Model Guardianship and
Conservatorship Act). The court may, for instance, indicate an amount of money that the ward
"II I Spend ci~
.I Ii
I as
a
.'
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l ii ci . \xiI t.illt-s melr tliiai
ii ollill it I liit
li o)lkV
with the consent of the guardian. Id. at 272. The court may require the guardian to assist the ward in
finding housing and securing medical care or education but permit the ward to make the final
decisions. Id. at 270.
303. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-04(f) (Supp. 1983).
304. See id
305. The UPC provides little statutory guidance in the area of powers transf'erred to the
guardian. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-12 (Supp. 1983) (description of the general powers and
duties of a guardian).
.
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Court said that "The consent [in marriage] is then present assent,
freely, voluntarily and understandingly given, representing a
mutual intention by competent contractingparties."1309 A guardian of an
incapacitated person, therefore, cannot by proxy furnish the ward's
necessary consent.
The Century Code specifically prohibits, in certain instances,
the marriage of persons institutionalized as severely retarded. 3 10 In
addition, a marriage may be annulled when either party was of
unsound mind at the time of the marriage. 3 1' While there is no
precise definition of the phrase "unsound mind" as used in this
section, the North Dakota Supreme Court has suggested that the
best test of capacity sufficient to contract a valid marriage is
whether there is capacity to understand the nature of the marriage
contract and its attendant duties and responsibilities. 3 12 Thus, even
though under guardianship, a person may still have sufficient
capacity to validly contract marriage. 3 13 Moreover, the order of a
county court is not conclusive concerning the ward's mental
capacity since, "[t]ests judicially applied for a determination of
incompetence in guardianship matters differ markedly from those
applied for determination of mental capacity to contract
marriage. "1314
North Dakota policy favors the validity of marriages. 3 15 Thus,
even though the marriage is prohibited, "a marriage contracted by
defendant, was both a drunkard and feebleminded. Johnson v..Johnson, 104 N.W.2d 8, 11 (N.D.
1960). After the plaintiff's discharge from a Minnesota hospital where he had received medical and
psychiatric care, the plaintiff and the defendant were married. Id. Prior to the plaintiff's release from
the Minnesota hospital, his relatives had filed a petition for the appointment of a guardian for the
person and property of the plaintiff. Id. Although this initial petition was dismissed, another
guardianship petition, filed after the plaintiff and defendant had separated, was granted. Id. at II12. After concluding that the evidence affirmatively established that the plaintiff had sufficient
competence to validly contract marriage, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the annulment
decreed by the district court. Id. at 18.
309. Id. at 12.
310. N.D. CENT CODE S 14-03-07 (1981). Section 14-03-07 provides that "[m]arriage by a
woman under the age of forty-five years or by a man of any age, unless he marries a woman over the
age of forty-five years, is prohibited if such a man or woman is institutionalized as severely
retarded." Id.
311. Id. 5 14-04-01 (3). Section 14-04-01 (3) provides in relevant part that:
A marriage may be annulled by an action in the district court to obtain a decree of
nullity for any of the following causes existing at the time of the marriage:
That either party was of unsound mine, unless such party, after coming to
reason, freely cohabitated with the other as husband or wife.
Id.
312.Johnson, 104 N.W.2d at 14.
313. Id. at 17.
314. Id.
315. See id. at 13. The validity of a voidable marriage can be questioned only by a direct
challenger. Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-03 (1981) (only incestuous marriages are absolutely
void).
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those parties is rendered merely voidable and not void." ' 3 16
Furthermore, when the parties have proven a marriage exists, "a

' 31 7
presumption arises that such a marriage is in all things valid."

Nevertheless, if a ward marries and does not have sufficient mental
capacity to validly consent to the marriage, the marriage is voidable
and subject to annulment. 3 18 An action to annul may be brought by
the party injured, a relative, or the guardian of the party of
3 19
unsound mind.

The Century Code does not indicate whether a guardian may
sue for divorce on behalf of his ward. 320 It does provide, however,
that a guardian of a ward of "unsound mind" may bring an action
to annul the marriage. 321 An annulment may be granted when the
ward lacks the mental capacity to give legally binding consent at the
time of the marriage. 322 Although the right of a guardian to sue for
divorce of his ward is questionable, courts generally hold that
guardians may maintain an action on behalf of their wards to
32 3
vacate and set aside a divorce decree.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has indicated
that the right to marry is fundamental to all citizens. 324 Therefore,

any single categorical classification of mentally retarded persons or
persons under guardianship, especially limited guardianship, that
would prohibit the right to marry would violate the due process and
325
equal protection clauses of the federal constitution.

B.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

The Century Code does not specifically give or deny a
guardian the power to consent to the termination of a ward's
parental rights. 326 There is, however, little doubt that without prior
316. 104 N.W.2d at 13.
317. Id. at 12.
318. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-04-01 (3) (1981). See supra note 311 for the text of § 14-04-01 (3).
319. N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-04-02(3)(1981).
320. See id. § 30.1-28-12 (Supp. 1983).
321. Id. § 14-04-02(3)(1981).
322. 104 N.W.2d at 14.
323. See Annot., 6 A. L.R.3n681 (1966).
324. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). The Court in Loving stated, "Marriage is one of
the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival."- Id.
325. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In Stanley, the Court struck down a state law that
presumed an unwed father was an unfit parent and determined that a hearing was required:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized
determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the deterttinative issue of
competence and care, when it explicitly distains present realities in deference to past
formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both
parent and child. It, therefore, cannot stand.

326. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-12 (Supp. 1983).
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court authorization a guardian does not have the power to give
3 27
such consent on his ward's behalf.
The Uniform Juvenile Court Act (UJCA) and the Revised
Uniform Adoption Act have been adopted by North Dakota and
provide for the termination of parental rights. 321 The North Dakota
Supreme Court in Kottsick v. Carlson3 2 9 indicated that the UJCA,
which provides the grounds for termination of parental rights, was
not amended by implication through the enactment of the Uniform
Adoption

Act. 330

Consequently,

the UJCA

controls

in cases

involving the termination of parental rights. 33 ' In McGurren v.
S. T. 332 the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the basic
premise in an action to terminate parental rights is that the parent
has a fundamental, natural right to his or her child that is of
constitutional dimension. 333 Although this right is not absolute, the
court found that the legislature had indicated its intent for
permitting removal of the child from his parents only when
334
necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public safety.
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized the
fundamental importance of the family and has recognized that the
right to conceive and to raise one's children is an essential, basic,
327. See MlcGurren v. S.T., 241 N.W.2d 690, 693 (N.D. 1976) (parent of a child has a
constitutional right to be heard on his fitness before the parent can be deprived of his parental rights
to Ihe child).
328. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-20 (1974 & Supp. 1983) (Uniform Juvenile Court Act); Id. ch.
14-15 (1981 & Supp. 1983) (Revised Uniform Adoption Act).
329. 241 N. W.2d 842 (N.D. 1976).
330. Kottsick v. Carlson, 241 N.W.2d 842, 846 (N.D. 1976). The Kottsick court found that all
indications pointed to the fact that the legislature did not intend to amend the Uniform Juvenile
Court Act by enacting the Uniform Adoption Act. Id. at 845-46.
331. Id. at 846. Section 27-20-44 of the North Dakota Century Code provides the bases for
termination of parental rights as follows:
1. The court by order may terminate the parental rights of a parent with respect to his
child if:
a. The parent has abandoned the child;
b. The child is a deprived child and the court finds that the conditions and causes
of the deprivation are likely to continue or will not be remedied and that by
reason thereof the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical,
mental, moral, or emotional harm; or
c. The written consent of the parent acknowledged before the court has been
given.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44 (1) (1974).
332. 241 N.W.2d 690 (N.D. 1976).
333. McGurren v. S.T., 241 N.W.2d 690, 695 (N.D. 1976).
334. Id. The court reviewed a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother who was only
13 years old and unmarried at the time of the child's birth. Id. at 692. On the date of birth, the child
was taken by the county social service board pursuant to a court order for placement in a foster
home. Id. Although the mother did not have a steady job and was dependent on her own mother for
support, the court concluded that because of the mother's tender years she was entitled to available
expert counseling before any further hearings could be held on terminating her parental right. Id. at
697. The basic premise in the case, the court declared, was that a parent has a fundamental, natural
right to her child. Id. at 695.
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civil right. 335 In Santosky v. Kramer3 36 the Court ruled that a clear

and convincing standard of proof must be met before a state may
completely and irrevocably sever the rights of natural parents to
their children. 337 Thus, before the state may terminate the parental
rights of a mentally or physically disabled parent, it must provide
338
due process and meet the higher standard of proof.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has often recognized the
importance of the parent-child relationship. In In re J.Z.339 the

court noted that parents have a constitutional right to the custody
and companionship of their children. 340 Although the right of a
parent to the custody of his child is not absolute, 34' a parent's right

is nevertheless paramount to that of any other person.3 42 The
burden of providing that a parent is not fit to retain custody of his
child rests upon the challenger. 343 In Waagen v. R.J.B. 344 the court
indicated that a child should be separated from his parents only
3 45
when necessary for his welfare or in the interests of public safety.
The importance of the parent-child relationship is also
recognized by the Century Code, which provides that a parent is
entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of any
335. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405"U.S. 645 (1972). The Court in Stanley held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment required a hearing to determine an unwed father's fitness as a
parent before his children could be taken from him in a dependency proceeding after the death of the
children's natural mother. Id. at 657-58.
336. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
337. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). After concluding that the fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not disipate
merely because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody, the Court
determined that a parental rights termination proceeding must provide the parents with
fundamentally fair procedures. Id. at 753-54. The Court also concluded that the state must support
its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 758-70.
338. Id. at 758-60.
339. 190 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1971). Although the court repeated the familiar phraselogy
concerning the rights of natural parents, it had little difficulty under the facts of this case in affirming
the district court's judgment terminating the parental rights of the appellants to their son. In reJ.Z.,
190 N.W.2d 27, 29-30, 36 (N.D. 1971).
340. Id. at 29-30.
341. In re R.D.S., 259 N.W.2d 636, 638 (N.D. 1977). The court agreed with the district court's
finding that the appellant's son was a deprived child and that his placement in a foster home was
necessary. Id. at 638. Nevertheless, the court determined that the evidence was not sufficient to
terminate the parental rights of the appellant. Id.
342. In reJ.V., 185 N.W.2d 487, 492 (N.D. 1971). The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed
a juvenile court order terminating the parental rights of a mother who had previously petitioned the
juvenile court to place her child in a licensed foster home. Id. The court noted that the legislature had
expressed a strong preference for parental guardianship. Id.
343. In re M.M.C., 277 N.W.2d 281, 284 (N.D. 1979). The court concluded that the challenger
had not established by clear and convincing evidence that a 48-year-old woman, who had a history of
mental health problems, was unable to supply physical and emotional care for her daughter. Id. at
286.
344. 248 N.W.2d 815 (N.D. 1976). In Waagen, the court affirmed a juvenile court decree
terminating the parental rights of an unwed mother to an infant born at the state hospital at
.Jamestown. Waagen v. R.J.B., 248 N.W.2d 815, 821 (N.D. 1976). Although the court noted that
the mental illnes of a oarent does not automatically render a child deprived, the primary
consideration is the welfare ot the child. Id. at 820-21.
345. Id. at 819.
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proceedings under the UJCA. 34 6 If the parent is indigent, the court

will provide counsel. 34 7 In addition, the North Dakota Supreme.
Court has determined that parental termination procedures are a
part of the UJCA, codified at chapter 27-20 of the Century Code,
and that the right to counsel extends to all parties involved in the
proceedings. 348 In light of the United States Supreme Court cases
and opinions by the North Dakota Supreme Court that declare the
importance and emphasize the fundamental nature of the rights of
parents to conceive and raise their children, it is doubtful that even
a full guardian has the power to consent, on his ward's behalf, to
the termination of his ward's parental rights.
C.

VOLUNTARY TREATMENT

1. Mental Illness, DrugAddiction, and Alcoholism
Voluntary admission to the state hospital or a public treatment
facility is limited to persons who are mentally ill or suffering from
drug addiction or alcoholism. 34 9 The definition of a "mentally ill
346. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (1)(1974). Section 27-20-26 (1) provides:
Except as otherwise provided under this chapter, a party is entitled to representation
by legal counsel at all stages of any proceedings under this chapter and, if as a needy
person he is unable to employ counsel, to have the court provide counsel for him. If a
party appears without counsel the court shall ascertain whether he knows of his right
thereto and to be provided with counsel by the court if he is a needy person. The court
may continue the proceeding to enable a party to obtain counsel and shall provide
counsel for an unrepresented needy person upon his request. Counsel must be
provided for a child not represented by his parent, guardian, or custodian. If the
interests of two or more parties conflict separate counsel shall be provided for each of
them.
Id.
347. Id.§ 27-20-26 (2). Section 27-20-26 (2) provides:
A needy person is one who at the time of requesting counsel is unable, without undue
financial hardship, to provide for full payment of legal counsel and all other necessary
expenses for representation. A child is not to be considered needy under this section if
his parents or parent can, without undue financial hardship, provide full payment for
legal counsel and other expenses of representation. Any parent entitled to the custody
of a child involved in a proceeding under this chapter shall, unless undue financial
hardship would ensue, be responsible for providing legal counsel and for paying other
necessary expenses of representation for their child. The court may enforce
performance of this duty by appropriate order. As used in this subsection, the word
iparent'
includes adoptive parents.
Id.
348. In re J.Z.. 190 N.W.2d 27, 31 (N.D. 1971). The court stated, "Parental termination
procedures are a part of theJuvenile Court Act, and the right to counsel extends to parties involved
in such proceedings. Id.
349. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-04 (Supp. 1983). Section 25-03.1-04 provides as follows:
An application for admission to the state hospital or a public treatment facility for
observation. diagnosis. care, or treatment as a voluntary patient may be made by any
person who is mentally ill, an alcoholic, or a drug addict, or who has symptoms of such
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person" specifically excludes some mentally retarded or mentally
deficient persons. 350 Although mental retardation by itself is not

sufficient to support either voluntary or involuntary admission to a
treatment facility such as the State Hospital, the definition of a
"person requiring treatment" indicates that a mentally retarded
person may also be suffering from mental illness, drug addiction, or
alcoholism and, therefore, require treatment.

35

'

The Century Code permits the parent or legal guardian of a
minor who is mentally ill, alcoholic, or a drug addict to apply for
the minor's admission as a voluntary patient.

352

There is no

statutory language that specifically gives similar authority to a
guardian of an incapacitated adult. However, North Dakota's
guardianship statute gives a full guardian the same powers, rights,
and duties respecting his ward that parents have respecting their
unemancipated minor child. 353 Furthermore, the statute provides
illnesses. An application otradmission as a voluntary patient may be made on behalf'
sf a minor who is mentally ill, an alcoholic, or a drug addict, or who has symptoms of
such illnesses, by his parent or legal guardian. The application may be submitted to a
public treatment facility or to the state hospital, both of which shall have the authority
to achtit and treat the applicant. Upon admittance, the superintendent or the director
shallimmediately designate a physician, psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, or mental
health professional to examine the patient.
Id.
350. Id. § 25-03.1-02 (10). " 'Mentally ill person' does not include a mentally retarded or
mentally deficient pei-soti of significantly subaverage general intellectual ftinctioning which
nriginlmtes (hiring (thedev.elopmental period anti is asociated \vilhi
inipairmnlt in adalptive
behaviot.
Id.
351. Id. 25-03-1.02 (II)
cIealnlet is Uillo\ s:

(Supp. 1983). Section 25-03.1-02 (II)

lefines a person rie(uiring
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Id.
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that, except as modified by order of the court when a limited
guardian is appointed, "a guardian may give any consents or
approvals that may be necessary to enable the ward to receive
medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment, or
service. ' ,54

Tle language of the statute providing for voluntary
admissions is clear and unequivocal; only parents or guardians of
minors are empowered to consent to their ward's "voluntary
admission." 355 Additionally, the guardian of an incapacitated adult
35 6
may provide such "voluntary consent" on behalf of their wards.
The potentially coerceive effect of "voluntary admission" by
guardians is a strong argument for following the procedure for
involuntary admission. For instance, persons who provide their
own consent for admission have a right to immediate release upon
their request. 35 7 If the release is not granted, judicial proceedings
for involuntary treatment must be initiated. 3 58 Yet, if a parent or
guardian had provided the "voluntary consent," release could be
359
conditioned upon the parent's or guardian's consent.
If the ward is a developmentally disabled person, the impact of
the Bill of Rights for Developmentally Disabled Persons must also
be considered: "No developmentally disabled shall be presumed to
be incompetent or shall be deprived of any constitutional, civil, or
legal right solely because of admission to residence at an institution
has the following powers and duties, except as modified by order of the court when the
guardianship is limited....
Id.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Id. 5 30.1-28-12 (1) (c).
Id. S 25-03.1-04. See supra note 349 for the text of § 25-03.1-04.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-12 (Supp. 1983).
Id. 5 25-03.1-06. Section 25-03.1-06 requires:

Any person voluntarily admitted for inpatient treatment to any treatment facility
or the state hospital shall be orally advised of the right to release and shall be further
advised in writing of his rights under this chapter. A voluntary patient who requests
his release shall be immediately released. However, if the superintendent or the
director determines that the patient is a person requiring treatment, the release may be
postponed until judicial proceedings for involuntary treatment have been held in the
county where the hospital or facility is located. The patient must be served the petition
within twenty-four hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, from the time release is
requested, unless extended by the magistrate for good cause shown. The treatment
hearing shall be held within five days, excluding weekends and holidays, from the time
the petition is served.
Id.
358. Id.
359. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). In Parhamthe Court approved a procedure whereby
parents could provide the voluntary consent for their children's admission to a state psychiatric
hospital. The situation in Parhammay be distinguished from a case in which a guardian provides the
consent since the Court relied on the presumption that as the natural guardians the parents of a child
act in the child's best interest. Id. at 602-03. The bond between a legal guardian and a ward is only a
legal relationship, created when the guardian is appointed.
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facility

or

solely

because

of

receipt

of

services

for

developmentally disabled persons. "306 Much of the support for the
limited guardianship bill came from groups concerned with
programs for the developmentally disabled; certainly a limited
be
guardianship and perhaps even plenary guardianship might
36 1
persons.
disabled
developmentally
considered a service for
Moreover, if a guardian of an incapacitated adult were able to
consent to the voluntary admission of his ward, all of the
procedural protections given to respondents facing involuntary
commitment proceedings would be circumvented. 362 Admission,
therefore, should properly be considered voluntary only when a
363
ward himself agrees and is capable of giving effective consent.
Although there are no reported North Dakota cases, nonconsenting
wards have successfully challenged "voluntary admission" by
guardians in other states. 364 Until the legislature acts or the North
Dakota Supreme Court has an opportunity to rule, it is unclear
under North Dakota law whether guardians of incapacitated adults
may consent to their ward's voluntary admission to the state
hospital or a similar treatment facility. Yet, the United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged that involuntary commitment to
a hospital results in a significant curtailment of liberty, requiring
due process protection.3 65 The potentially coercive effect on
"voluntary admission" by a legal guardian indicates that the
procedure for involuntary admission should be followed.
2. Servicesfor Developmentally DisabledPersons
The Century Code empowers the parents or legal guardian of
a mentally deficient person to apply for admission on behalf of the
child or ward to the Grafton State School or another state
facility. 36 6 North Dakota's guardianship statute also empowers a
360. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-01.2-03 (Supp. 1983).
361. Limited Guardianship, 1983: Hearingson H.B. 1057 Before theSenate Comm. on Social Services and
Veteran's Affairs, 48th N.D. Leg. (1983) (statement of Tom Wallner, Director, North Dakota State
Council on Developmental Disabilities; statement of Beth Wosick, Assistant Director, Mental
Health Association; statement of Nancy Burns, Easter Seal Society of North Dakota).
362. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 25-03.1 (Supp. 1983).
363. P. FRIEDMAN, [HE RIGHTS OF MENTALiY RETARDED PERSONS 36-38 (1976).
648 P.2d 1067, 1071-72 (1982).
Colo.
-,
364. See, e.g., P.F. v. Walsh, __

The

Colorado Supreme Court recently considered a challenge to Colorado's statutory scheme that
authorized a minor to be involuntarily admitted to a state psychiatric hospital with the consent of a
, 648 P.2d 1071-72. The Colorado court found the statutoryparent or legal guardian. 1d. at
procedure unconstitutional and void as a violation of due process because it contained no statutory
admission standard to be applied by the hospital staff when determining whether to accept a minor
for treatment. Id. at -, 648 P.2d at 1071.
365. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94 (1980).
366. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-04-05 (1) (a) (Supp. 1983).
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guardian to "give any consents or approvals that may be necessary
to enable the ward to receive medical or other professional care,
counsel, treatment, or service." '3 67 Admission for services for
should be
considered
disabled
persons
developmentally
"voluntary" only if the ward agrees to the program or placement
3 68
and is capable of giving informed consent.

D.

PARTICIPATION

IN

PROGRAMS

AND

SERVICES

FOR

THE

DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED

The North Dakota Legislature has clearly indicated that
persons with developmental disabilities shall enjoy the right to
appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation for those
disabilities. 369 A partial listing of the rights provided by the
Century Code includes: the right to a free and appropriate
education, the right to an individualized habilitation plan, the right
to social interaction, and the right to appropriate medical care and
treatment.3 7 0 A right to refuse services is also included in the Bill of
Rights for Developmentally Disabled Persons. 371 Although this
section speaks of a "recipient of services," the legislative history
indicates an intent to extend these rights to all developmentally
37 2
disabled persons in the state.
Another consideration regarding programs and services for the
developmentally disabled is their right to an education. 373 Basing
its decision on both the state and federal constitutions, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has concluded that handicapped children
who can benefit from an education have a constitutional right to
367.
368.
369.
Persons).
370.
371.

Id. 5 30.1-28-12 (1)(c).
See supra note 359 and accompanying text for a discussion on voluntary consent.
N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 25-01.2 (Supp. 1983) (Bill of Rights for Developmentally Disabled
See id.
Id. S 25-01.2-15. Section 25-01.2-15 provides:

An adult recipient of services, or, if the recipient is a minor or under guardianship, the
recipient's guardian or parent shall be given the opportunity to refuse generally
accepted mental health or developmental disability services, including but not limited
to medication, unless those services are necessary to prevent the recipient from
causing serious harm to himself or to others. The facility director shall inform a
recipient or guardian or parent of a minor who refuses generally accepted services of
alternate services available, the risks of those alternate services, and the possible
consequences to the recipient of the refusal of services.
Id.
Chapter 25-01.2 of the Century Code is known as the "Bill of Rights for Developmentally
Disabled Persons.' See N.D. CENT. CODF ch. 25-01.2 (Supp. 1983).
372. Bill of Rights for Developmentally Disabled Persons, 1981: Hearings on S. B. 2252 Before House
Comm. on Social Services and Veteran's Affairs, 47th N.D. Leg. 1981 (statement of.Judith Podoll, North
Dakota Council for Developmental Disabilities).
373. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-01.2-07 (Supp. 1983).
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such education. 37 4 Furthermore, the statement of legislative intent
for the chapter of the Century Code concerned with special
education of exceptional children also recognizes the right of a
handicapped student to an educational program that will enable the
student to attain the maximum level of self-sufficiency and
independence.

1

5

North Dakota's guardianship statute permits the appointment
of a guardian only when the court finds that the appointment is
necessary or desirable as a means of providing continuing care and
supervision of an incapacitated person. 37 6 The statute also
mandates that the court exercise its authority to appoint a guardian
"consistent with the maximum self-reliance and independence of
the incapacitated person. 11 77 Guardians must act in the best
interests of their wards when exercising authority to give or
withhold any consent necessary to enable their wards to participate
in educational programs or to receive other medical or professional care, counsel, treatment, or services. 378 By accepting
appointment a guardian submits to the court's jurisdiction in
subsequent proceedings relating to the guardianship, including
removal of the guardian and the appointment of a successor
guardian. 3 79 The test in removal proceedings is the best interests of
in North D-akota-h ave- the
374. In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d. 441, 446 (N.D. 1974). All- cire
right to a public school education. Id. Thus, a failure to provide educational opportunities for
handicapped children, unless they are unable to benefit at all from an education, is violative of
provisions contained in the North Dakota Constitution. Id.
375. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-59-02.1 (1981).
376. Id. § 30.1-28-04 (2) (Supp. 1983). Section 30.1-28-04 (2) provides in part:
The court may appoint a guardian as requested if it is satisfied that the person for
whom a guardian is sought is incapacitated and that the appointment is necessary or
desirable as a means of providing continuing care and supervision of the incapacitated
person. Alternatively, the court may dismiss' the proceeding or enter any other
appropriate order.
Id.
377. Id. § 30.1-28-04 (1). Section 30.1-28-04 (1) provides:
The court shall exercise the authority conferred in this chapter consistent with the
maximum self-reliance and independence of the incapacitated person and make
appointive and other orders only to the extent necessitated by the incapacitated
person's actual mental and adaptive limitations or other conditions warranting the
procedure. The court shall determine in all cases in which a guardian is appointed
whether the incapacitated person is mentally incompetent and as such is not qualified
to vote.
Id.
378. In re Guardianship ofPescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 7,226 N.W.2d 180, 181 (1975). The court in
Pescinski denied a petition to permit the removal of a kidney of a mentally incompetent ward because
no benefit had been shown to the ward. Id. at 7, 226 N.W.2d at 181. After determining that there
was no statutory authority giving the probate court power to authorize a kidney transplant under
these circumstances, the court specifically refused to adopt the doctrine of substituted judgment. Id.
at 8, 26 N.W.2d at 182.
379. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-05 (1976). Section 30.1-28-05 provides:
By accepting appointment, a guardian submits personally to the jurisdiction of
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the ward. 380 It would follow, therefore, that the test of a guardian's
power to withhold the consent necessary to permit his ward to
participate in programs or receive services for developmentally
disabled persons should also be the best interest of the ward. If a
guardian were permitted unlimited discretion to give or withhold
consent, the legislative mandate of the limited guardianship

3 81
amendments would be defeated.

The statute gives a guardian of an incapacitated person "the
same powers, rights, and duties respecting his ward that a parent
has respecting his unemancipated minor child," ' 382 but even a
natural parent's authority is not unrestricted. For example, when a
court determines parental abuse is present, it may free a child from
the dominion of the parent although the parental duty of support
and education may be still enforced.3 8 3 Moreover, a court may
terminate parental rights under certain conditions. 38 4 The Century

Code also imposes a penalty on a parent, guardian, or custodian of
a child who abuses or willfully neglects or refuses to provide food,
education, or other necessary care for the health, morals, or wellbeing of their child. 385 Additional limitations on the authority of
parents and guardians can be found in the section of the Century
Code relating to compulsory school attendance. 38 6 In most
instances, attendance in regular or special education programs is
required. 387 In State v. Shaver388 the North Dakota Supreme Court
determined that the state's compelling interest in providing
education for its citizens outweighed any burden imposed on the
389
parents' free exercise of religion.
the court in any proceeding relating to the guardianship that may be instituted by any
interested person. Notice of any proceeding shall be delivered to the guardian or
mailed to him by ordinary mail at his address as listed in the court records and to his
address as then known to the petitioner.
Id.
380. Id. § 30.1-28-07 (1). Section 30.1-28-07 (1) provides:
On petition of the ward or any person interested in his welfare, the court may remove
a guardian and appoint a successor ifin the best interest ofthic ward. On petition ofthe
guardian, the court may accept his resignation and make any other order which may
be appropriate.
Id.

381. See id. t 30. 1-28-04 (limited gu1taoianship im etndtents em ourage die sce0filiance
i1)dCjl1deznCe Of(lit' wa;rd).

and

382, Id. § 30.1-28-04,
383. See id. § 14-09-19 (1981).
384. Id. 27-20-44 (1974).
385, Id.
:186. Id ch. 15-34.1 (1981 & Supp. 1983) (tioriittlsorx s(- hol attem ani ').
387. Seeid. § 15-34.1-03.
388. 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980). The defendants were convicted ofviolating North Dakota's
compulsory school attendance law. State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 885 (N.D. 1980).
389. Id. at 897. The court recently reaffirmed its decision in Shaver. State v. Rivinius, 328
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In cases involving non-life-threatening medical conditions,
some courts have refused to order that a child receive medical
treatment over the objection of his parents when their objections
were not based upon religious grounds.

390

The trend, however,

indicates a shift in emphasis from whether parental objections
constitute neglect to the best interests of the child. 39 1 In In re Phillip
B. 39 2 the court concluded that parental custody had caused serious
detriment to the child and that the child's interests would be best
served by granting the guardianship petition. 393 In a New York
case, after a father withdrew his consent for surgery to repair his
child's congenital spinal disorder, a petition was filed for
394
appointment of a guardian authorized to consent to the surgery.
The New York court granted the petition and concluded that when
surgery would give the child a reasonable chance to live a useful
395
life parental inaction should not be allowed to deny that chance.
The purpose of guardianship is to protect the welfare of the
ward. 3 96 Thus, a guardian's power to consent or withhold consent
must be exercised to promote the best interests of his ward. 397 If a
guardian unreasonably refuses to permit his ward to participate in
programs or receive services that would be beneficial to the ward,
either the ward or any interested party may petition the court for
the guardian's removal and the appointment of a successor or for
permission from the court authorizing the ward's participation in
the program.

E.

398

NON-THERAPEUTIC SURGERY

Whether North Dakota law permits a guardian to consent to
his ward's participation in a non-therapeutic medical procedure to
benefit another person is unclear. The statute empowers a guardian
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1525 (1983). The defendants in Rivinius,.
N.W.2d 220, 224-28 (N.D. 1982), cert.
.
m pulsory sc'hIol ucndam c k
like those ii
a57irr. wcre convicted of %iolaiing Nr i i)ako~'s
Id. at 221-22. The defendants sent their children to a religious school not approved by the County
Superintendent of Schools and the Superintendent of Public Instruction. Id.
390. Arot.. 97 A .. R .3n.421, 423 (1973).
391. In re Warien B.. 92 Cal. App..3d 799.__ . 156 Cal. Rptr. 48. 51 (Cal.C.App. 1979).
cert
denied sub nom. Bothman v. Warren B., 445 U.S. 949 (1980) (state officials may interfere with
parental autonomy and in family matters to protect a "child's health, educational development and
emotionally well-being").
19831).
392. 139 Cal. App. 392 407. 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (:al.Ci.Apl.
. 188 Cal Rptr. 781. 792 (Cal.i.App. 1983).
In ' I1hillip B.. 139 Cal. App. 3d 407. _
39:3.
394. In rcCiccro. 101 Misc. 2d 699.

__.

421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y.Sup. Ci

19791).

, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
395. Id. at
396. SeeIn reThoreson's Guardianship, 72 N.D. 101, 105-06, 4 N.W.2d 822, 824(1942).
397. In rePescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 7, 226 N.W.2d 180, 181 (1975) (removal of a kidney would
not be in the ward's best interests).
398. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-07 (1)(1976). See supra note 380 for the text of § 30.1-28-07
(1).
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to "give any consents or approvals that may be necessary to enable
the ward to receive medical or other professional care, counsel,
treatment, or service." 399 Furthermore, there are no reported
North Dakota cases that detail the scope and type of medical
treatment that a guardian may authorize. Nevertheless, the power
of a parent or guardian to consent to surgical intrusions on the
person of a minor or ward is probably limited to the power to
consent to medical treatment to effect a cure of an injury or disease,
including examination and diagnosis as well as administering
remedies 400
The Bill of Rights for Developmentally Disabled Persons
prohibits hazardous or intensive medical procedures or treatment
that are not directly related to the specific goals of the individual's
treatment program. 40 1 The Bill of Rights for Developmentally
Disabled Persons requires a court order before a person receiving
services at any institution for the developmentally disabled is
subject to psychosurgery, sterilization, medical or behavioral
402
research, or pharmacological research.
In In re Pescinski4 ° 3 the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered a
petition in a guardianship proceeding to permit the removal of a
kidney of a mentally incompetent ward for the purpose of
transferring it to the ward's sister, who was suffering from kidney
failure. 40 4 The Wisconsin court concluded that the doctrine of
substituted judgement 4 5 should not be utilized when the ward
received no benefit from the surgery. 40 6 The court also determined
399. N.D. CENT. CODE S 30.1-28-12 (1) (c) (Supp. 1983).
400. See In re Moe, 385 Mass. App. 555,
-,
432 N.E.2d 712, 716-17 (1982) (parent or
guardian cannot consent to the sterilization of a ward absent statutory orjudicial authorization).
401. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE § 25-01.2-09 (Supp. 1983).
402. Id.
403. 67 Wis. 2d 4, 226 N.W.2d 180 (1975).
404. In re Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 6-7,226 N.W.2d 180, 181 (1975).
405. In re Roe, III, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981). In Roe III the Massachusett's highest
court considered the right of a mentally incompetent person, who was not institutionalized, to refuse
treatment with antipsychotic drugs. Resting its decision on state common law and the federal
constitution, the Massachusetts court held that a person has a protected liberty interest in deciding
"whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful medical treatment that is represented by
the administration of antipsychotic drugs." Id. at __, 421 N.E.2d at 51 n.9. The court in Roe III
determined that this liberty interest was of such importance that only an overwhelming state interest
could support a decision to submit noninstitutionalized mental patients to the administration of
potentially harmful antipsychotic drugs. Id. at __
, 421 N.E.2d at 51. The court also determined
that, even though incompetent, a person does not forfeit his protected liberty interest and is thus
entitled to have "substituted judgment" exercised on his behalf. Id. The "substituted judgment"
doctrine can be defined as a judicial determination of what an incompetent person would do if he
were competent. This requires an inquiry into the values and preferences of the incompetent
individual. Id. at __
, 421 N.E.2d at 51-52. The Roe III court emphasized that the determination
"must 'give the fullest possible expression to the character and circumstances' " of the person. Id. at
__
, 421 N.E.2d at 56 (citation omitted). The "substituted judgment" doctrine does not require
medical expertise; instead, the court dons the mantle of the incompetent person. Id. at -,
421
N.E.2d at 52. The court identified six relevant, but not exclusive factors that can be used to
determine whether to approve painful medical treatment for an incompetent individual for whom a
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that without the valid consent of a ward or the ward's guardian ad
litem the probate court did not have authority to order nontherapeutic surgery.

40 7

An opposite result was reached by Kentucky's highest court in
Strunk v. Strunk. 40 8 The Strunk court held that a court of equity had
the power to permit the removal of a kidney from an incompetent
ward, upon the petition of his parent-guardian, to be donated to his
brother who was dying of a fatal kidney disease. 40 9 A significant
factor in the court's decision was its finding that the operation
would also benefit the incompetent ward because he was
emotionally and psychologically dependent upon his brother and
that the ward's well-being would be jeopardized more by the loss of
his brother than by the removal of his kidney. 41 0 Although the

Strunk court discussed the doctrine of substituted judgment in some
detail, its decision was based upon the benefits to the incompetent
ward, not on the theory that the ward would have consented to the
operation if competent.

41

Nevertheless, a number of courts have,

in recent years, utilized the doctrine of substituted judgment to
412
authorize various transactions on behalf of incompetent wards.
Although there are no reported North Dakota cases
concerning a guardian's authority to consent to non-therapeutic
surgery, the event that a guardian's statutory authority to give any
consent necessary to enable his ward to receive "medical care" will
be construed to allow non-therapeutic surgery without specific
court authorization is unlikely. 41 3 Consequently, in the absence of
specific statutory authority, guardians should be advised to seek
prior court approval before consenting to non-therapeutic surgery
on behalf of their wards.
"substituted judgment" is necessary: "(1) the ward's expressed preferences regarding the
treatment; (2) his religious beliefs; (3) the impact upon the ward's family; (4) the probability of
adverse side effects; (5) the consequences if treatment is refused; and (6) the prognosis with
treatment." Id.at __, 421 N.E.2d at 57.
406. In re Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 8, 226 N.W.2d 180, 182 (1975). The court declined to adopt
the doctrine since it historically has not allowed property of the incompetent to be given away as gifts
without the actual consent of the incompetent. Id.
407. Id.
408. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
409. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 147-49 (Ky. 1969).
410. Id. at 146.
411. Id. at 148-49.
412. See Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972) (kidney transplant);
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977)
(refusal to submit a profoundly retarded man to chemotherapy); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d
647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (discontinuance of life support systems); State v. Perricone, 37
N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962) (blood transfusion over objection of child's
parents); In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 372 A.2d 360 (Ch.Div. 1977) (amputation ofa leg).
2
413. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE S 30.1- 8-12 (1)(c)(Supp. 1983).
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STERILIZATION AND ABORTION

1. North Dakota Law
In North Dakota, there is no specific statutory authority giving
guardians of incapacitated persons or minors the power to consent
41 4
to the sterilization of their wards.
a. Institutionalized Persons
The Century Code prohibits the sterilization of any person
receiving services at an institution or facility for the
developmentally disabled except in conformity with a court
order. 41 5 In addition, there are a number of procedural
requirements that must be met before a court can issue an order
permitting the involuntary sterilization of a developmentally
disabled resident or recipient of services. 416 The application of these
procedural requirements is limited to institutions or facilities that
provide residential care 4 17 or to any institution or facility for the
developmentally disabled. 4 18 The terms "institution or facility"
include "any school, hospital, residence center, group home, or
any other facility operated by any public or private agency,
organization,
or institution, which provides services to

developmentally disabled persons.'

'419

The definition of "services for developmentally disabled
persons" includes a variety of services: " 'Service or services for
414. See id. § 30.1-27-09 (1976) (guardianship of minors); 30.1-28-12 (!upp.
powers and duties of'guardians).
415. Id. S 25-01.2-09 (4) (Supp. 1983).
416. Id. § 25-01.2-11. Section 25-01.2-11 provides as follows:

1983) (general

A court of competent jurisdiction may issue the orders required for the procedures or
treatments in subsection 4 of section 25-01.2-09 upon application of the party alleging
the necessity of the procedure, the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the
treatment, or the person's guardian, following a hearing on the application.
1. The person receiving or entitled to treatment shall:
a. Receive prior notice of the hearing;
b. Have the right and the opportunity to present evidence; and
c. Have the right to be confronted with and to cross-examine witnesses.
2. If the developmentally disabled person cannot afford counsel, the court shall
appoint an attorney not less than ten days before the hearing.
3. The burden of proof shall be on the party alleging the necessity of the procedure or
treatment.
4, An order allowing the procedure or treatment may not be granted unless the party
alleging the necessity of the procedure or treatment proves by clear and convincing
evidence that the procedure is in the best interest of the recipient and that no less
drastic measures are feasible.
This section applies only with respect to an institution or facility that provides
residential care.
Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. S 25-01.2-09 (4).
419. Id. S 25-01.2-01 (2).
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developmentally disabled persons, means services provided by
any public or private agency, organization, or institution, directed
toward the alleviation of a developmental disability or toward the
social, personal, physical, or economic habilitation or rehabilitation
of a developmentally disabled person. "420 In addition, chapter 2516 of the Century Code defines the term "group home" to include
"any community residential facility, foster home, family care
facility, or other similar home for developmentally disabled
persons. ' 421
In 1979, the North Dakota Legislature repealed the chapter of
the Century Code that permitted sterilization of residents of the
Grafton State School with the consent of a parent or guardian and
the unanimous approval of a five member board. 422 The sparse
legislative history reveals two reasons for the repeal: the inactivity
of the board and the belief that compulsory sterilization was
423
unconstitutional under both the state and federal constitutions.
b. Noninstitutionalized Persons
The North Dakota Supreme Court has not spoken on the
question of whether the sterilization of a retarded person with the
consent of his guardian may be regarded as voluntary. The
procedural protections that were passed by the legislature as a part
of a Bill of Rights for Developmentally Disabled Persons should be
considered in determining the issue of voluntariness.4 24 One motive
for the introduction of the legislation was to ensure due process for
developmentally disabled persons in institutions. 4 25 This legislation
prohibits the presumption of incompetence or deprivation of "any
constitutional, civil, or legal right solely because of admission to or
residence at an institution or facility or solely because of receipt of
services for developmentally disabled persons." 4 26
The testimony supporting the Bill of Rights for
Developmentally Disabled Persons indicates that many of the Bill's
supporters believed that the residents of state institutions and those
420. Id. %25-01.2-01-(4).
421. Id. 525-16-14 (1) (b).
422. SeeAct of Feb. 8, 1979, ch. 93, 1979 N.D. Laws 156.
423. Inactive Entities, 1979: Hearings on H.B. 1079 Before the Comm. on State and Federal Government,
46th N.D. Leg. (1979) (statement of Rep. Lee).
424.See N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-01.2-11 (Supp. 1983).
425. Bill of Rights for Developmentally Disabled Persons, 1981: Hearings on S.B. 2253 Before Senate
Comm. on Social Services and Veteran's Affairs, 47th N.D. Leg. (1981) (statement ofJudith Podoll, North.
Dakota Council for Developmental Disabilities).
2
426. N.D. CENT. CODE S 5-01.2-03 (Supp. 1983).
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4 27
receiving services were the group most in need of protection.
Moreover, there is no mention of a legislative decision to restrict
the scope of the legislature to those developmentally disabled
persons residing in institutions. 428 During the committee hearings
on the Bill one speaker stated, "This bill does speak to the
people in Grafton, but it also speaks to all the developmentally disabled
persons in the state of North Dakota. "429 This testimony and other
remarks by legislators indicate that they believed the Bill of Rights
should be applied to virtually all developmentally disabled persons
in the state. 430 Nevertheless, neither the guardianship statute nor
the Bill of Rights for Developmentally Disabled Persons specifically
addresses the question of whether the sterilization of a ward with
the substituted consent of his guardian is voluntary.

2. Federal ConstitutionalLaw
Fifty-seven years ago the United States Supreme Court in Buck
v. Bell 43 1 upheld a state sterilization statute and its application to a

mentally-retarded woman, who was an inmate of a state institution
for the "epileptics and feeble minded."

432

The decision in Buck v.

Bell, however, contains numerous statements about mentally.
retarded persons that are now questionable. 433 Even though Buck v.
Bell has not been explicitly overruled, 43 4 the Court in Skinner v.
Oklahoma4

35

did overturn a state statute providing for sterilization of

felons with three or more convictions and established procreation as
427. Bill of Rights for Developmentally Disabled Persons. 1981: Hearines on S. B. 2253 Before Senat
Comm. on Social Service and Veteran's Affairs, 47th N.D. Leg. (1981) (statement ofJudith Podoll, North
Dakota Council for Develcpmental Disabilities).
428. SeeS.B. 2253, 47th N.D. Leg. (1981).
429. Bill of Rights for Developmentally Disabled Persons, 1981: Hearings on S. B. 2253 Before Senate
Comm. on Social Services and Veteran's Affairs, 47th N.D. Leg. (1981) (statement ofJudith Podoll, North
Dakota Council for Developmental Disabilities) (emphasis added).
430 See S.B. 2253, 47th N.D. Leg. (1981).
431. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
432. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
433. Id. at 207-08. Some of these questionable statements are as follows:
It would be strange if it [public welfare] could not call upon those who already sap the
strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices [sterilization], often not felt to be such by
those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is
better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime,
or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly
unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is
Three generations of imbeciles
broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes ....
are enough.
Id. at 207 (citation omitted).
434. SeeL. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 923 (1978).

435. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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a fundamental right.4
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Courts today are reluctant to justify the sterilization of
incompetents on the basis of the discredited eugenic theories used
to buttress the Court's decision in Buck v. Bell. 437 Furthermore,
although the Supreme Court has not considered
the
constitutionality of involuntary sterilization statutes since Skinner, a.
number of commentators have concluded that such laws, regardless
of their rationale, are unconstitutional unless compulsory
sterilization is the only means to further a compelling state
interest.

4 38

Other recent Supreme Court decisions imply a more general
right to reproductive autonomy, including the opportunity to
prevent procreation through noncompulsory sterilization. In
Griswold v. Connecticut43 9 the Court identified a right of privacy in
marriage that prevented the state from intruding into decisions
involving contraception. 44 0 Later in Eisenstadt v. Baird44 1 the Court
declared that the right to privacy included the fundamental right to
choose whether to beget a child free from unwarranted government
intrusion. 442 Other cases have invalidated substantial restrictions
on abortion not justified by a compelling state interest based on
a constituional right of personal control over procreative
decisions. 443

These

cases,

along

with

Skinner,

point

to

complimentary fundamental rights of procreation and sterilization,
444
including the right to choose between alternatives.
3. SubstitutedJudgment
Some courts have indicated that a person's inability to make a
436. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race).
437. See, e.g., In reGrady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (right to choose among procreation,
sterilization, and other methods of contraception is an important privacy right of all individuals
including incompetents). But see Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976)
(objective of statute is to prevent procreation of children by mentally retarded persons who would
probably procreate children with serious physical, mental, or nervous disorders); Cook v. State, 9
Or. App. 224, 495 P.2d 768 (1972) (court cited Buck v. Bell, noting that sterilization was considered
beneficial to the patient aod society because it pcrmitted lie patient to be discharged. icturn to (i t(
tolnnitinv.

and bectme self-supporting).

438. See, e.g.. Burgdorf& Burgdorf. The WVicked lVitch is Ahnost Dead.- Buck v. Bel and Serilizationo
tlandhnappcd Persoi.,, 50 IEMP. 1..Q. 995, 1030-33 (1977): Note. Derelopnents in the Law: 7hIr
Constituion and the Fa-niir. 93 HaKv. L. Ri.%'. 1159, 1296-1308 (11980).
439. 381 U. S.-47(1965).
4-10. G risw old %.Cotni et icut. 381 U. S. 479, 485-86 1965
-141. 405 U.S. 438(1972).
442. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
443. See, e.g, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
444. See In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235,
-, 426 A.2d 467, 473-76 (1981) (individual's constitutional
riglt of privacy includes right to retfse to undergo sllrilizatioin): In ir Eherhirly. 102 \is. 2d1539.
562. 307 N.W.2d 881, 891-92 (1Q73) (sterilization invol

es .t personal procrvatie

c decision).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60:45

choice between procreation and sterilization or other methods of
contraception should not result in a loss of those constitutional
interests.4 45 Accordingly, these courts have authorized a procedure
by which the judgment of a court can be substituted for the
44 6
incompetent's consent.
In In re Moel 47 a mother, as guardian for her mentally retarded
adult daughter, filed a petition seeking an order permitting a
sterilization operation for her daughter.4 4 8 After finding that a
court of general jurisdiction.in Massachusetts had the power to hear
and adjudicate a petition for sterilization, the court determined that
the doctrine of substituted judgment could be utilized.4 4 9 In In re
A. W.4 50 the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the petition of the
parents of a mentally retarded minor, and after determining that
Colorado's general parental consent statute did not govern,
concluded that a full judicial hearing was necessary and that the
interests of the minor should be represented by a guardian ad
4 52 the Wisconsin
litem.4 5 1 In In re Eberhardy
Supreme Court
considered a petition for sterilization from the parents and
guardians of an adult mentally retarded woman. Although the
Wisconsin court found that the Wisconsin circuit court had
jurisdiction to consider the sterilization petition, it concluded that
the grant of such a petition was not appropriate since the
legislature, not the court, is the preferred branch of government to
determine public policy. 453 This court specifically refused to permit
the use of the doctrine of substituted judgment to authorize the
4 54
sterilization of a person not capable of giving consent.
a. Substantive Standards
In In re Moe455 the court identified several factors that courts
utilize to assist in the determination of a substituted judgment
permitting sterilization:
456
(1) Whether the ward is able to make an informed choice;
445. See, e.g.-In reGr'ady, 85 N.J. 235, -,
426 A.2d 467, 474-75 (1981).
446. See In re Moe, 385 Mass. App. 555, -, 432 N.E.2d 712, 719-20 (1982); In re Grady, 85
N.J. 235, .
426 A.2d 467, 474-76 (1981). But see In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 566-67, 307
N.W.2d 881, 893-94 (1981).
447. 385 Mass. App. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982).
448. In re Moe, 385 Mass. App. 555, -. , 432 N.E.2d 712, 715 (1982).
449. Id. at -, 432 N.E.2d at 719.
450. - Colo.__, 637 P.2d 366 (1981).
451. In reA.W.,

Coio.

-,

637 P.2d 366, 370-75 (1981).

-,

452. 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981).
453. In fe Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 570-71, 307 N.W.2d 881,895 (1981).
454. Id.
455. 385 Mass. App. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982).
456. In reMoe, 385 Mass. App. 555,

-,

432 N.E.2d 712, 721 (1982)

19841

SPECIAL PROJECT

457
(2) The physical ability of the ward to procreate;
of
(3) The possibility and effectiveness of less intrusive means
458
training;
and
education,
birth control, including supervision,
(4) The medical necessity for the procedure; evidence that the
possibility of a pregnancy would threaten the physical and mental
459
health of the ward;
(5) The nature and extent of the person's disability, the ability
to care for a child, including the possibility that the individual may
at some future time marry and, with a spouse, be capable of caring
46 0
for a child;
ward will engage in sexual activity
the
(6) The possibility that 46
1
likely to result in pregnancy;
(7) The likelihood of physical or mental harm from the
462
sterilization procedure, as well as from pregnancy or childbirth.
Additionally, when considering the best interests of the ward, the
welfare of society or convenience or peace of mind of the ward's
46 3
parents or guardian should play no part.

b. Procedural Standards
Procedural protection requires a court order for the
sterilization of individuals who are themselves incapable of giving
consent.4 64 In addition, the appointment of a guardian ad litem or
counsel may be necessary.4 65 Most often a clear and convincing
standard of proof is required in a case when fundamental rights are
at stake. 466 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has
mandated the utilization of at least a standard of clear and
convincing evidence in the analogous area of civil commitment
proceedings.4 6 7 North Dakota's statutes also require the use of a
clear and convincing standard for authorization of the sterilization
of a developmentally disabled person who is the resident of a state
4 68
institution.
While the Century Code does not specifically authorize or
deny guardians' power to consent to the sterilization of their wards,
, 432 N.E.2d at 721-22.
457. Id. at __
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 447 A.2d 1244, 1254 (Md. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 790(1983).
432 N.E.2d 712, 721 (1982).
464. See In re Moe 385 Mass. App. 555, __,
465. Id. at__, 432 N.E.2d at 721 n.6.
426 A.2d 467, 483 (1981).
466. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, __,
467. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979).
468. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 25-01.2-11 (4) (Supp. 1983).
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section 25-01.2-11 of the Century Code specifically requires4 69a
hearing on the application before the issuance of a court order.
Even though the language of the section limits its application to
developmentally disabled persons who are residents of state
institutions or recipients of services for developmentally disabled
persons, it may have a wider application since the definition of
"services for developmentally disabled persons" is broad enough to
encompass most developmentally disabled persons. 47 0 In addition,
the legislative history of the Bill of Rights for Developmentally
Disabled Persons reveals no intent to exclude disabled persons who
do not reside in state institutions or receive services, but rather
suggests that it was intended to apply to all developmentally
disabled persons.4 7 1 Finally, the fundamental nature of the
complimentary rights of procreation and sterilization indicate that
the procedural protection of the statute should be extended to any
application by a guardian for permission to consent to the
47 2
sterilization of his ward.
4. Abortion
Abortion, like sterilization, implicates the fundamental right
to reproductive autonomy. 47 3 A woman's decision to obtain an
abortion is a fundamental right based upon the right of privacy
implicit in the Constitution.4 7 4 The United States Supreme Court
has also indicated that a state cannot condition a pregnant minor's
right to an abortion on the consent of her parents.4 7 5 Moreover,
there is an increasing awareness that the interests of parents or
guardians and their mentally retarded children or wards are not
necessarily identical. 47 6 The potential for abuse in sterilization or
abortion operations for mentally retarded persons is illustrated in
Stump v. Sparkman. 47 7 In Stump the sterilization operation ordered by
the judge upon the mother's petition was performed without notice
to the minor. 478 In a similar case, brought under the Civil Rights
Act by a handicapped plaintiff alleging a conspiracy to sterilize her
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. SeeS.B. 2253, 47th N.D. Leg. (1981).
472. N.D. CENT. CODE S 25-01.2-11 (Supp. 1983).
473. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-55 (1973).
474. Id. at 153.
475. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976).
476. P. FRIEDMAN, supra note 363, at 121."
477. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
478. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 352-53 (1978). In Stump the ward was told the
operation was for the removal of her appendix. Id.
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against her will, the First Circuit Court of Appeals said,
"irrevocably terminating a patient's ability to bear children
without her consent is a deprivation of a fundamental
constitutional right. "49
Unauthorized abortions might violate North Dakota's
48 1
4 80
and also constitute assault and battery.
Abortion Control Act
Whether a guardian has the power to consent to an abortion on
behalf of his ward is unclear in North Dakota. In other
jurisdictions, however, the issue is well settled that a guardian's
power to consent to medical treatment for a ward does not
encompass the power to consent to the administering or
withholding of extraordinary medical treatment.4 8 2 Since abortion
is an extraordinary and highly intrusive medical procedure a
guardian must obtain a proper judicial order before the guardian
can validly consent to the operation. Given the absence of clarity in
the statute setting out the general powers of a guardian,4 83 an
appointing court should specify that a guardian does not have the
power to consent to either the administering or withholding of
extraordinary medical treatment, including sterilization and
abortion, without prior court authorization.
V. CONCLUSION
By providing for limited guardianship and mandating the least
restrictive alternative in guardianship appointments, the 1983
Limited Guardianship Act remedied major flaws in North Dakota's
guardianship statute. Nevertheless, major deficiencies still remain.
First, the Uniform Probate Code utilizes a vague standard of
incapacity. Procedural protections are of little value when the
statutory definition of incapacity rests upon a court's interpretation
of a phrase as vague as "responsible decisions." In addition, the
utility of the list of suspect categories of incapacity requires
evaluation. The fundamental rights at stake in guardianship
proceedings mandate a higher standard of proof than the
traditional civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence. Since
the justification of a guardianship proceeding is the alleged
4,9. l),,wns v. Sow'telle, 574 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1978).
480. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-02.1-03(1981) (Abortion Control Act).
481. Id. S 12.1-17-01 (1976)(assa_ult and battery).
, 370 N.E.2d
482. See, e.g, Superintendent of Belcher Town v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 658,
417, 432-34 (1977). The Model Guardianship and Conservatorship Act, 5 16 (5) specifically
prohibits a guardian from consenting on behalf of a disabled or partially disabled person to an
abortion, sterilization, or other extraordinary medical procedures. 3 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 264,
274 (1979) (reprint of the Model Guardianship and Conservatorship Act).
483. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE S 30.1-28-12 (Supp. 1983).
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diminished capacity of the respondent, the minimal notice
requirements should be strengthened to require that the contents of
notice alert the proposed ward of the nature and consequences of
the proceeding.
In addition, the potentiality of stripping an individual of basic
rights indicates the need for a right to court appointed counsel.
Except for developmentally disabled persons, the current statute
contains no mechanism for review and oversight of guardianships.
Furthermore, no reporting requirement exists. Thus, there is a
need for additional reform.
Although technically the statutes concerning county public
administrators are not a part of the guardianship statute, they
designate the county public administrator as the ex officio guardian
and conservator in and for his county. In addition, section 11-21-06
of the North Dakota Century Code provides that he can be
appointed guardian and conservator. This is a potential problem
area that needs investigation.
The limited guardianship amendments may reduce the social
stigma and legal disability of guardianship, but even limited
guardianship has its problems. Limited guardianship may increase
the use of guardianship proceedings by relatives and providers of
various services by providing an alternative to the harshness of the
all-or-nothing traditional model of guardianship. Guardianship
should require an exhaustion of other alternatives. The most
effective safeguard against inappropriate appointments of
guardians or conservators is a zealous advocate for the allegedly
incapacitated person. The need for continued reform still exists if
guardianship is to become a legal device that will truly promote and
protect the well-being of the ward.
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